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Adding A Second Opt-Out To




The U.S. Judicial Conference endorsement of a "second opt-
out opportunity" for class action settlements to supplement the
option for pre-certification exit under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure ("Rule") 23(b)(3) is retrograde.! It represents a victory for the
myopic "proceduralist" way of thinking.! In operation it will im-
pose loss on everyone whose welfare depends on federal class ac-
tion enforcement of tort and other civil liability to prevent and
compensate harm resulting from business risk taking ("mass pro-
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I thank the participants at The University
of Chicago Legal Forum Symposium on "Current Issues in Class Action Litigation," (Nov
2002), David Abrams, Guy Halfteck, Brett Harvey, Randy Kozel, Liz Oyer, Wesley Shih,
John Snyder, Beth Stewart, and Alexander Volokh for helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this essay. Background for my present argument is provided in recently published work,
see, for example, Charles Fried and David Rosenberg, Making Tort Law: What Should Be
Done and Who Should Do It (AEI 2003); David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class
Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 Harv L Rev 831 (2002); David
Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Ac-
tions for Future Loss, 88 Va L Rev 1871 (2002).
' See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, News Release, Judicial Conference
Judgeship Recommendations Endorsed by Administration 2 (Sept 24, 2002) ("Report"),
available online at <http'//www.uscourts.gov/Press_-Releasesjudconf902.pdf> (visited Aug
22, 2003).
2 "Proceduralist" refers to the approach that ignores deterrence and compensation
objectives and related individual welfare effects of the substantive law in evaluating the
operation and potential redesign of the civil liability system. In this case involving class
action opt-out, as in many, the basic deficiency of the proceduralist mode is compounded
by shoddy cost-benefit analysis, general disregard of pre-suit, ex ante conditions, and
resort to deontological and even ontological claims, usually asserted in the form of vacuous
and question-begging moralisms, hackneyed slogans, pseudo-traditions, and other concep-
tual shell games like "plaintiff autonomy," "day in court," and "process values." Consider
David Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 Notre Dame L Rev 913,
937-38 (1998) (critiquing the proceduralist support for class action opt-out in mass tort
cases).
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duction risks").3 To be sure, the Conference merely provides ex-
plicit authority for what is already widespread practice, but that
hardly excuses making matters worse. Indeed, the Conference, as
the author of the basically flawed 1966 revisions of Rule 23,'
had-and squandered-the legislative 'chance to make matters
much better. At a minimum, it should have applied advances in
theoretical and empirical understanding of the social benefits
derived from collectively adjudicating civil liability in business
risk-taking cases not only to reject the "second opt-out," but also
to eliminate the requirement for pre-certification opt-out.'
3 The reference to cases of "mass production risk" denotes the capacious scope of my
argument for collective adjudication. It applies to the entire universe of civil actions (in
law and equity) that serve (or affect) the law enforcement functions of civil liability, in
particular deterrence and insurance. My analysis thus relates to all cases arising from the
risk generated by governmental or non-governmental mass production processes and
goods (products and services, including information and law enforcement), whether la-
beled antitrust, securities and other consumer fraud, contract, corporate governance,
constitutional rights and civil liberties claims, torts, or otherwise. More specifically, con-
cerning the class of cases labeled "tort" or "mass tort," my analysis encompasses cases
involving harm to property and person, actualized or risk based. It rejects the common,
functionally arbitrary, and unrealistic taxonomies of mass tort law and litigation. See, for
example, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Futures Problem, 148 U Pa L Rev 1901, 1902-05
(2000) (distinguishing between mass disasters, mass accidents, toxic torts, and true mass
torts). See also Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591, 616 (1997) (distinguishing
between small stake and large stake claims); Castano v American Tobacco Co, 84 F3d 734,
748-49 (5th Cir 1996) (distinguishing between pre-certification matured and unmatured
cases); Deborah Hensler, et al, Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private
Gain 5-8 (RAND 1999) (distinguishing between securities, consumer, tort, employment,
civil rights, and government-related class actions).
' In addition to inexplicable proceduralist disregard of the deterrence and insurance
functions of civil liability and general neglect of the relative effects of rule choices on indi-
vidual welfare, the 1966 revisions also displayed neophytic understanding of substantive
law governing mass production risks, operational dynamics of procedure, and economics of
practice.
The following diagram depicts the litigation class action with opportunities for pre-
certification and second, class settlement opt-out:
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While drawing on previously published normative arguments
supporting a general regime of mandatory collectivized adjudica-
tion,6 my present critique of class action opt-out focuses mainly on
what I regard as the post-Amchem "default" conception of the
Rule 23(b)(3) class action.7 Its defining feature is what I term the
1 2 3
Class Class Settlement
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Class Member Exercises Class Member ExehtPte-ou rtuitcises Second Opt-outOpt-Out to Sue in the t u n S a d rStandard Process of PocSe inStndr
SSrav nerg Ano Separate Actions
(1) Class action is filed.
(2) Class action is certified to include all putative class members except those who have
elected pre-certification opt-out.
(3) The defendant and class counsel reach a class settlement agreement establishing a
schedule of damage payments for specified harms covering all class members except those
who exercise the second opt-out opportunity.' See, for example, David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only
Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 Harv L Rev 831 (2002).
i By pdefault" conception, I mean that the Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 23is best explained as establishing certain practices-in particular, the "anti-redistribution
principle" discussed in the following text-as the norm for federal class action unless and
until expressly modified by the Judicial Conference and Congress or, regarding the state-
created causes of action, by state courts or legislatures. An alternative explanation wouldview the Court's constraints on class action in light of contemporaneous rulings on pre-
emption, expert testimony, punitive damages, and other areas bearing on civil liability as
covertly implementing its kepticism or dislike of the burgeoning role of tort cases in polic-ing mass production risks, and of the consequent burden on federal courts through diver-
sity jurisdiction. This explanation is plausible, if rather facile. It rests largely on specula-
tion about unverifiable motives for judicial opinions. Moreover, the explanation is of little
interest even if true, because such motivations would evidently derive from visceral reac-
tions rather than careful and systematic study on the Court's part. While students of
constitutional law seem content, indeed, enthralled to spend their days seeking and re-
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"anti-redistribution principle." To a great extent, this principle
determines the "fairness" of using Rule 23(b)(3) to resolve claims
by trial or settlement. Its distributive baseline is the expected
recovery value a claim would have if prosecuted in the standard
separate-action process-a process largely driven by market
forces. Accordingly, the "fairness" test requires structural as well
as substantive assurances that class members' recoveries should,
as far as practical, reflect the litigation strength of their claims in
the absence of class action. This prescription for claim-related
wealth maximization implies the general subordination, if not
irrelevance, of insurance theory and objectives in the allocation of
damages among class members. In reality, of course, the anti-
redistribution principle's greatest significance is in class actions
comprised of classable claims, which, litigated separately or
jointly, have net recovery value in the standard market process.
More specifically, the anti-redistribution principle is important to
those claims that plaintiff-attorneys find financially worth litigat-
ing in the absence of a class action mechanism. Generally, as ex-
plained below, the marketability of a claim in the standard proc-
ess depends on the net return an attorney expects from (i) acquir-
ing a financial interest in some fraction of the classable claims
and making a commensurate "mass production" investment to
develop them, and (ii) free riding on the work product of other
attorneys investing in the litigation of similar claims.
Affording class members the choice of remaining in the class
action or opting out to prosecute their claims in the standard
market process is conventionally viewed as necessary to effectu-
ate the anti-redistribution principle. Thus, the Conference ra-
tionalized the "second opt-out" as principally providing class
members with the "self-determination and control" they would
have in "traditional litigation" to appraise the value of settlement
in light of materially changed circumstances, "reliev[ing] indi-
viduals from the unforeseen consequences of inaction or decisions
made at the time of certification, when limited meaningful infor-
mation was available."9 Moreover, the Conference concluded, the
second opt-out provides "added assurance to the supervising court
that a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate [-] just the
sponding to the Justices' hidden motives (sometimes aggrandized as "philosophies"), the
Court's purported animus towards mass torts and class actions should not be taken seri-
ously, as it would be no more useful in prompting fruitful analysis than popular prejudice.
See Rosenberg, 115 Harv L Rev at 838 (cited in note 6).
Report at 8 (cited in note 1).
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sort of 'structural assurance of fairness,' mentioned in Amchem
Products, that permits class actions in the first place.""°
The Conference rationalization of opt-out, and the prevailing
consensus it expresses, is mistaken. Effectuation of the anti-
redistribution principle-assuming that the appropriate default
conception of Rule 23(b)(3) should embrace this principle-does
not require opt-out prior to certification, at the time of class set-
tlement, or at any other point. Rather, providing any opportunity
for exit from the class action will undermine not only the anti-
redistribution principle-increasing litigation costs and risks
from strategic behavior as well as reducing the recoverable
wealth that class action scale advantages make possible-but
also the basic deterrence objective of collective adjudication to-
gether with any insurance benefit.
My argument, in short, is that allowing opt-out from Rule
23(b)(3) class actions-first, second, or in any number or phase of
the process-is unnecessarily destructive of individual welfare.
Part I briefly summarizes the normative general theory justifying
mandatory collectivized adjudication-in practical terms, adjudi-
cation by mandatory litigation class action-of mass production
risk cases. Positing that the social objective for the law is to en-
hance individual well-being and that individuals seek maximum
well-being, Part I explains that these conditions imply use of the
legal system to minimize the sum of accident costs-specifically,
the total costs of precautions against accident, unavoidable harm,
risk-bearing, and administration of the legal system-and, as-
suming the need for courts to play a role in this law enforcement
effort, the use of mandatory litigation class action to adjudicate
mass production risk cases.
In light of the general normative case for mandatory class
action, but deferring for later consideration any insurance objec-
tive, Part II shows that that applying Rule 23(b)(3) on a manda-
tory basis would secure optimal deterrence while fully comporting
with the anti-redistribution principle and facilitating related pur-
suit of individual wealth maximization. Both are readily accom-
modated simply by decoupling these functions, essentially sepa-
rating the class action into two basically distinct stages of deci-
sion-making and fee-awards: first, common-question determina-
tion of aggregate liability and damages for deterrence purposes,
and second, contingent on first-stage judgment for the class, non-
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common question distribution of damages by conventional indi-
vidualizing process and standards.
Part III then assesses the various instrumental rationales for
allowing any opportunity to opt-out from a Rule 23(b)(3) litigation
class action-that is, complete exit from the class action to prose-
cute a claim on both common and non-common questions in the
standard market process. It concludes that opt-out is not merely
unnecessary, but would be counterproductive. The principal prob-
lems for which opt-out provides a supposed solution, particularly
in checking deficient representation of class interests by class
counsel and enabling class members to maximize individual re-
coveries, are either unaffected by opt-out or far better remedied
without it. Moreover, beyond adding considerable unnecessary
expense, opt-out promotes opportunities and incentives for class
counsel defalcations and generally undercuts the anti-
redistribution principle as well as the deterrence function.
Bringing into play an optimal insurance objective to mass
production liability, Part IV extends the critique of opt-out class
action to several designs for class settlement of risk based claims
that incorporate a "back-end opt-out," essentially the "second opt-
out" endorsed by the Conference." This discussion demonstrates
the perversity of the second opt-out and ultimately of the anti-
redistribution principle. It will be seen that nothing could be
more detrimental to the welfare of individuals in need of insur-
ance supplied by civil liability recoveries than to enforce that
principle through opt-out or otherwise.
12
Id.
1 While mandatory-litigation class action greatly improves the capacity of the civil
liability system to achieve deterrence and insurance objectives, that gain does not imply
any productive superiority of the judicial system over other alternatives, in particular
administrative regulation and first-party commercial and governmental (social) insurance.
See Pegram v Herdrich, 530 US 211, 220-22 (2000) ("[C]omplicated fact-finding and ...
debatable social judgment[s] are not wisely required of courts ... We think, then, that
courts are not in a position to derive a sound legal principle to differentiate an HMO like
Carle from other HMOs."). Indeed, quite the opposite is the case: the general, well-
documented advantages of these "alternatives" dictate resorting to courts only to the ex-
tent of systematic failure of administrative regulation to control risk appropriately and of
government and commercial first-party insurers to cover loss adequately. The judicial
system lacks the capacity and resources to make socially appropriate decisions in mass
production risk cases. These cases typically present daunting questions of science, tech-
nology, business and government finance, organization and operation, and economics and
other fields of public policy. Reliable resolution of these questions demands far more ex-
perience and training than the judicial system's lay personnel (judges, lawyers, and juries)
possess and far more information than its adversarial processes deployed strategically and
in accord with the means and self-interests of stakeholders (litigants, lawyers and others)
are willing, or, indeed, able to supply. See David Rosenberg, The Path Not Taken, 110
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I. GENERAL NORMATIVE THEORY JUSTIFYING MANDATORY
COLLECTIVIZED ADJUDICATION
The following sketches the argument for mandatory collectiv-
ized adjudication-in practical terms, for mandatory litigation
class action. The argument proceeds from the premise that the
legal system should be designed to enhance individual welfare. In
short, the legal system should resolve mass production risk cases
according to the mode of adjudication that an individual seeking
maximum welfare would prefer. To discern that preference, I
posit a single individual who has the opportunity to choose the
legal system for managing accident risk before knowing his or her
own prospects in that world regarding incidence of accidents, ac-
cess to resources, and advantage in the chosen legal system. 3
Essentially, the individual internalizes all possible fates, in-
cluding actual preferences of all possible people in all possible
states of the world. Aiming to maximize well-being regardless of
Harv L Rev 1040, 1044 (1997) (noting that law schools are "tracking in the path of increas-
ing social irrelevance and irresponsibility"). Indeed, to correct these deficiencies would
require not only a vast infusion of tax revenues and a transformation in the curriculum
and faculty of "law schools" (more accurately, "court law schools"), but also education of
the public to accept the notion that lawmaking by courts, like any other state agency,
entails the "tragic choices" of cost-benefit tradeoffs. Consider Guido Calabresi and Philip
Bobbitt, Tragic Choices (Norton 1978) (analyzing societal choices to distribute scarce re-
sources for net social benefits that thereby necessarily incur social costs). See also W. Kim
Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J Legal Stud 107,
118, 127, 134-35 (2001).
" In deriving the objectives and means of the legal system based on the rational
preferences of a single, welfare-maximizing individual, this analysis draws on work
developing and applying the ex ante perspective in normative theories of individual ra-
tional choice, most notably John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behav-
ior, 44 Soc Res 623 (1977). See also John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 136-37 (Harvard
1971); Charles Fried, An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social
Choice 204 (Harvard 1970); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Re-
sources, 10 Phil & Pub Aff 283 (1981). The "behind the veil" approach has been criticized
for adopting or implicitly assuming certain processes and conditions for conducting multi-
party bargaining in the "original position." See, for example, Michael J. Sandel, Liberal-
ism and the Limits of Justice 126 (Cambridge 1982) (criticizing Rawls's "veil of igno-
rance"). However, this criticism is misplaced here. Postulating a single individual stating
personal, rational preferences eliminates any need to explain or justify the method by
which multiple parties, possibly with varying traits (and interests) would bargain and
reach agreement. It does not entail making interpersonal comparisons of utility. Nor is it
subject to the criticism that the individual ex ante is unrealistically or arbitrarily assumed
to be a detached, neutral decision-maker, who has no personal stake in his or her choices
or preferences for the ex post legal system. To the contrary, the posited "original position"
implies not only that the individual ex ante decides with knowledge of how living under
one or another alternative legal regime will affect a person's welfare, given his or her
accident, distributive, and other relevant fates, but also that the individual ex ante neces-
sarily will live under the chosen regime and bear the consequences.
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what fate has in store, the individual rationally selects a legal
system that minimizes the sum of accident costs. 4 Any and every
one in the same, original position would choose the same legal
system. Specifically, the preferred system would employ civil li-
ability to provide two goods: optimal deterrence that prevents
unreasonable accident risks (risks that are more costly to bear
than to avoid) and optimal insurance of the residual, reasonable
accident risk. 5 Of central importance, the individual ex ante
would, given the opportunity, select a system that prioritized op-
timal deterrence over compensating loss from otherwise prevent-
able unreasonable risk, or any other litigation-related interest,
such as personal control over the prosecution of claims. 1" These
conclusions reflect the overwhelming evidence of peoples' re-
vealed and expressed preferences and follow logically from the
proposition that efficient reduction of accident costs increases the
individual's expected net welfare across all possible states of the
world.17
" My conception of rationality consists of the three simple axioms that comprise the
foundation of rational choice theory, the study of individual choice under conditions of
uncertainty and risk that under girds the basic theories of law enforcement (including
general deterrence) and insurance. See generally Harsanyi, 44 Soc Res at 623 (cited in
note 13) (explaining the components of rational behavior). First, I assume that individu-
als compare all alternatives consistently, meaning that if A is preferred to B and B is
preferred to C, then A is preferred to C. Second, I assume that individuals prefer a lot-
tery with more valuable prizes to a lottery with the same probabilities but in which one
or more of the prizes is less valuable. Third, I assume that individuals have continuous
preferences, so that a small shift in the value of an outcome would not produce a drastic
shift in individuals' valuations of that outcome. These axioms supply the complete basis
for proving that individuals will maximize the expectation of their utility-that is, the
sum of the utilities corresponding to each outcome weighted by the probability that each
outcome will be realized.
" I will assume that application of the anti-redistribution principle precludes using
class actions to supply optimal insurance. Therefore, I will concentrate on the deterrence
objective, and defer to Part III discussion of optimal insurance theory and its implications
for the design of class actions.
" This result depends on full insurance coverage of reasonable risk. Were coverage of
reasonable risk less than full, a highly risk-averse individual might sacrifice optimal de-
terrence of unreasonable risk for higher levels of deterrence or compensation to reduce the
overall gap in coverage. This point is significant for the practical design of the legal sys-
tem. However, it does not diminish the need for deriving the best benchmark against
which to gauge both the degree of individual welfare sacrificed by settling for second-best
and the worth of efforts at improving the system.
" Of course, it is always possible to premise lawmaking on some alternative postu-
late than the aim of maximizing individual welfare and the axioms of rational choice
theory. However, I suspect that few would find the results appealing. For an extended
argument in this vein, see Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare:
Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice, 32 J Legal Stud 331,
342-51 (2003). Thus, suppose an individual, after consulting weather reports on the
chance of rain, decides not to carry an umbrella to work for reasons of convenience or
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Also, as elaborated in my previous writings, the individual ex
ante would prefer collectivized adjudication of mass production
liability to maximize the gains from scale investment as well as
scale economy." Because of its scale benefits, collectivized adjudi-
cation synergistically increases the social value of mass produc-
tion liability relative to any other mode of adjudication: the whole
is greater than the sum of its parts. As will be explained shortly,
in the absence of collectivized adjudication defendants possess an
asymmetric scale advantage that skews litigation outcomes in
their favor and therefore undermines deterrence and insurance
objectives. Only collectivized adjudication assures that mass pro-
duction liability will minimize total accident costs through opti-
mal deterrence and insurance.
The practical import of this normative argument is that the
legal system should mandate litigation class action without any
opportunity for exit or opt-out (or its functional equivalent) to
enforce mass production liability. Collective action to achieve op-
timal tort deterrence and insurance on the plaintiffs' side re-
quires this mast-tying mechanism barring opt-out for two related
reasons. First, the standard claims market generally fails to
achieve equivalent collectivization. Collective action costs-
incurred, for example, in organizing, managing, allocating risks
and benefits, and monitoring performance and allegiance to thejoint venture--and problems (in particular the problem of free
riding)2" will likely prevent the level of collectivization that would
otherwise. If it rains, this person might well regret that decision. But I doubt anyone
would urge passing a law that required people to carry around umbrellas when they
would not want to because they might otherwise regret their decisions. Rejecting the ex
ante perspective when evaluating more complex, but vital, decisions might lead to simi-
larly anomalous results. For example, rejecting the ex ante perspective might lead to
outlawing the purchase of insurance in order to protect those who do not experience an
insured loss during the policy period from feeling regret over having paid the premium.
Similarly, it might entail forbidding consumers from buying safer cars because they
might nonetheless get hurt in an accident and regret paying extra without avail. Indeed,
we would have to bar business investments because an investor might be unhappy if a
venture fails.
" Rosenberg, 115 Harv L Rev at 848-50 (cited in note 6). The basis for this argument
was initially developed in David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure
Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv L Rev 849, 902-08 (1984).
" Suppose, for example, lawyers A and B have similar claims, each for $100, andincur litigation costs of $10 on the common questions. A and B are each better off merg-
ing representation, with A doing the work once for both claims. The costs of bargaining
over how to split the surplus of $10, however, will drain value from, and may well pre-
clude, a mutually beneficial agreement.
0 At the limit, when only one claim will be prosecuted to final judgment and the
underlying work product is costless to copy and use in subsequent cases, free riding
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maximize the benefits of scale economies and investment to
achieve optimal deterrence and insurance.21
Second, the deficiencies in plaintiffs' scale incentives from
fractional aggregation are greatly magnified because, as a practi-
cal matter, mass production defendants normally exploit the
scale opportunities afforded by universal aggregation. Naturally
aggregating its interest in classable claims, a mass production
defendant has full scale incentives to make and spread the costs
of an optimal investment in developing the defense side of the
common questions.2 2 Defendant's asymmetric scale advantage-
the functional equivalent of a de facto class action-translates
might avoid virtually all duplicative litigation costs, except for the considerable expenses
involved in the competitive acquisition of claims. But in reality, uncertainty about which
claim will first reach final judgment, time bars that compel claim filings, and threats of
sanctions enforcing mechanical requirements related to pleading, discovery, and pretrial
preparation generate redundant work in the initial stages. In addition, the pervasive
incentives for free riding leave lawyers uncertain whether anyone will file and prosecute
a claim to final judgment, prompting "fence sitting" strategies of multiple filings and
discovery to avoid time bar and other sanctions for lack of prosecution. The relatively
high information costs of tracking claim filings, compounded by the common defense
strategy of settling strong claims, also tend to inhibit free riding. This strategy tends to
hasten filings of strong claims for settlement and weaker claims for trial in the expecta-
tion that the stronger ones will settle.
2 Thus, the claims market results in fractional aggregation of the claims arising from
any given mass production accident. Though competing law firms cooperate to some
degree, they largely develop their respective claim holdings through a combination of
investments based on exploiting limited scale economy and investment opportunities
and free riding on one another's work product. Only sheer happenstance would produce a
case in which the contingent, fractional aggregation of claims in the standard market
process might coincidentally provide the aggregate net expected return needed to moti-
vate a law firm to make the optimal investment. Information costs would render im-
practical any judicial effort to determine whether the serendipitous congruence be-
tween the level of collectivization produced by market forces and that which is nec-
essary to assure optimal deterrence and insurance has actually occurred in any
given case. Indeed, fractional aggregation never minimizes the sum of accident costs
because it cannot fully exploit scale economies by spreading common-question costs
over all claims.
2 This is not to deny that the standard market process takes a toll on defendants.
Needless redundancy taxes their resources. For example, even though the defendant can
invest once and for all in developing the documentary and empirical bases for an expert
scientific opinion, the potential for numerous, overlapping, or widely separated actions
may require hiring and preparing more than one expert. Similarly, the defendant will
hire attorneys and other personnel to perform purely duplicative work. Defendants may
also bear substantial coordination costs in cases that involve multiple named or potential
defendants. The Firestone Tire/Ford Explorer litigation offers an example, indicating
that coordination costs can be high even when firms have a long-standing, pre-
litigation contractual relationship. Courts can mandate that defendants be sued as a
class to overcome collective action problems and costs that prevent multiple defendants
from fully exploiting scale economies, thereby promoting defendants' optimal investment
in developing shared positions on common questions. See FRCP 23(a) ("one or more
members of a class ... may be sued") (emphasis added).
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into a greater chance of its prevailing on the common questions.
This systemic bias, favoring defendant over the court as well as
A settlement example usefully illustrates the general adverse deterrence effects
from systemic bias favoring defendants. Assume that a firm's activity poses a risk to one
hundred individuals, each of whom will suffer a $500,000 loss in the event of accident; the
firm can avoid the risk by spending twenty million dollars on precautions. Suppose that
the parties can make only two levels of investment on the common questions: $100,000 or
five million dollars. Further, should both sides invest five million dollars, each will have a
50 percent probability of recovering or avoiding total damages at trial, but if not, then the
party investing five million dollars will gain the advantage of a 70 percent probability of
success against the party investing $100,000. (For sake of simplicity, I have eliminated
the possibility of both parties investing $100,000.) Since most cases settle, consider the
parties' relative bargaining positions if plaintiffs prosecute their claims through either of
two "market" modes: (a) a series of separate actions or (b) a joint venture comprising a
sufficient number of claims to make the five million dollar investment. (I use the stan-
dard, symmetric information model of litigation settlement and the parties' respective
reservation points in bargaining. See generally Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and
Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs,
11 J Legal Stud 55, 56-58 (1982) (utilizing a model that assumes parties view litigation
and settlement as a financial matter). In the model, defendant's maximum offer equals the
expected judgment at trial plus litigation costs; plaintiffs minimum demand equals the
expected judgment at trial minus litigation costs. Assuming equal bargaining power, that
the parties have roughly the same information and aversion to risk, and that there is
consensus on the expected judgment, on-average settlement will occur at the mean point
between the maximum offer and minimum demand.)
Separate action. Exploiting scale economies of a de facto class action, the defendant
invests five million dollars for a 70 percent probability of success at trial because each
plaintiff it confronts will have an individual incentive to invest only $100,000 on the com-
mon questions. Thus, given a 30 percent probability of success, the expected judgment in
any given case equals $150,000 (= 30 percent x $500,000). Spreading the five million dol-
lars cost for its unified defense across all one hundred potential claims, the defendant
effectively invests $50,000 per claim and therefore will settle with each plaintiff for no
more than $200,000 (= $150,000 + $50,000). Separately bearing the concentrated cost of
the $100,000 investment on common questions, each plaintiff will settle for as little as
$50,000 (= $150,000 - $100,000). All else being equal, the parties will settle at the mean of
their reservation points: $125,000 per claim (= ($200,00 + $50,000) x 50 percent).
Joint venture. A minimum of fifty of the one hundred plaintiffs must band together
to make the five million dollar investment worthwhile. (At forty-nine claims, the joint
venture is indifferent because both investments promise net aggregate recovery from trial
of $7.25 million.) Should the unlikely event occur that 50 percent of the plaintiffs proceed
jointly (and ignoring collective action costs), both parties would make equal investments
yielding each a 50 percent probability of success at trial. Nevertheless, while the defen-
dant would spread the cost across all claims effectively reducing its per-claim expense to
$50,000, plaintiffs could spread the cost only over fifty claims equaling $100,000 per claim.
Consequently, given consensus on the expected judgment of $12.5 million (= fifty claims x
$500,000 loss x 50 percent probability of success), defendant's maximum settlement offer
equals fifteen million dollars (= $12.5 million + $2.5 million (half the litigation costs)).
Plaintiffs' minimum demand equals $7.5 million (= $12.5 million - five million dollars in
litigation costs). If the parties settle at the mean point, plaintiffs' aggregate recovery
would be $11.25 million, or $225,000 per claim.
Note that neither separate actions by one hundred claimants nor a joint venture by
half and separate actions by the remaining fifty (ignoring potential for free riding) will
confront the defendant with sufficient threatened liability to motivate the optimal invest-
ment of twenty million dollars in precautions. Separate actions result in total threatened
liability of $12.5 million. When the joint venture is coupled with fifty separate actions, the
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plaintiffs, poses a major obstacle to achieving optimal tort deter-
rence and insurance. A defendant will make investments in liti-
gation on the merits-or even in abusive litigation-that the
plaintiffs' attorney cannot match or counter, and that a court pre-
siding over a fraction of the claims would be unable to assess and
remedy effectively. In an adversarial process, asymmetry in liti-
gation power exacts social costs by skewing outcomes. 24 Here out-
comes are skewed in defendants' favor, thus undermining the
social objective of optimal tort deterrence.
II. MANDATORY DECOUPLED CLASS ACTION SERVES DETERRENCE
PRIORITY AND ANTI-REDISTRIBUTION PRINCIPLE
This Part shows that Rule 23(b)(3) class actions can be adju-
dicated on a mandatory basis with no opportunity for opt-out to
achieve the priority for optimal deterrence, while fully comport-
ing with the anti-redistribution principle. 25 Two key assumptions
shape this analysis. First, opt-out is taken to mean a class mem-
ber's prerogative of unconditional self-exclusion from the class
action to prosecute (or forgo) suit on all questions-common and
non-common-in the standard market process. In particular, I
assume that opt-out affords class members the opportunity to exit
before class trial or settlement of the common questions without
bearing any obligation to pay the full pro rata share of class
counsel's fee for prosecuting the class claim on the common ques-
total threatened liability still turns up short at $17.5 million (= $11.25 million + 50 x
$125,000).
" The problem is well known at the extreme of "low stake" claims-cases involving
loss that is large in the aggregate, but too small as incurred by each plaintiff for a compe-
tent attorney to consider any single claim economically worth prosecuting. The dominant
consensus is that the principal function of class action is to correct the obvious asymmetric
litigation power in such cases, though generally no rational justification is given for doing
so. Only a few commentators have recognized the deterrence justification for small-claim
class actions. See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 626-27
(5th ed Aspen 1998) (noting that it is important for defendants to confront the costs of
their violation in small claim lawsuits); Harry Kalven, Jr. and Maurice Rosenfield, The
Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U Chi L Rev 684, 685-86 (1941); Geoffrey P.
Miller, Class Actions, in Peter Newman, ed, 1 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
and the Law 257 (Stockton 1998). No one, however, recognizes the general problem of
systemic bias that vests mass producers with de facto class action advantages over plain-
tiffs and courts in the separate action process for adjudicating civil cases. See, for exam-
ple, In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc, 51 F3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir 1995) (Posner) (unreliably
projecting class action outcome merely from verdicts in series of separate actions).
' Because I argue in Part IV that application of the anti-redistribution principle
precludes using class actions to supply optimal insurance, I will concentrate on the deter-
rence objective here and defer to Part IV for discussion of optimal insurance theory and its
implications for the design of class actions.
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tions.26 Second, because we are not concerned with the instru-
mental reasons for opt-out-in particular, its supposed utility as
a "market check" against conflicts of interests between the class
and class counsel and among class members-it is appropriate to
confine the present analysis to a case of well-motivated class rep-
resentation.27 This Part seeks only to show that, when well moti-
vated by properly determined court-awarded fees, class counsel
will fully exploit scale to make and spread the costs of an optimal
investment in prosecuting the class action.
A. Decoupling Deterrence and Damage Distribution Functions
There is a readily available design for mandatory Rule
23(b)(3) class actions that would promote the priority of optimal
deterrence without violating the anti-redistribution principle.
That rule design would decouple determination of deterrence
from distribution of damages. As I have shown elsewhere, de-
coupling enables class actions to achieve both optimal deterrence
and insurance.28 However, the decoupling design can be used even
when the anti-redistribution principle dictates distribution of
damages to maximize individual wealth rather than welfare. The
decoupling design for class actions entails simply separating the
class action into two basic stages.
In the first deterrence stage, the court would determine the
defendant's liability and damages in the aggregate. For purposes
of deterring unreasonable risk taking in the design of mass pro-
duction processes and goods, the only relevant questions are
those common to all claims. Indeed, with the exception of back-
ground historical issues, for the most part regarding whether
and, if so, how the defendant created the risk at issue, all of the
common questions that determine aggregate liability and dam-
ages, such as the marginal benefit-cost reasonableness of the risk
" But see In re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation, 2003 US Dist LEXIS 18141 (E D Pa 2003)
(requiring class members who opt out of antitrust class action to set aside percentage of
any settlement or judgment they win to compensate class counsel for five years of work
developing plaintiffs' case on the common questions).
2 The supposed instrumental utility of opt-out will be considered in Part III.
For recent development of the decoupling design for class action, see David
Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Ac-
tions for Future Loss, 88 Va L Rev 1871 (2002) (noting that the "integrated judgment"
holds class action deterrence benefits hostage to the costs and contingencies of individual-
izing compensation for class members, and in the process thwarts both objectives, and
proposing to solve this problem by decoupling deterrence from compensation functions of
mass tort class action.)
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and extent of actual or projected causally connected, sanctionable
harm, are statistical as well as aggregate by nature.29 As such,
the court can resolve these questions by using streamlined proc-
esses and methods of scientific proof, including statistical sam-
pling, modeling, and extrapolation to determine aggregate liabil-
ity and damages on the scientifically sound basis of probabilisti-
cally proportioned estimation. Moreover, employing statistical
methods produces corresponding synergistic gains from scale
economies and investment, thereby increasing the overall efficacy
and reliability of class action adjudication of mass production tort
liability. Assuming the first stage aggregate liability and damage
determination results in judgment for the class, the court would
order the defendant to pay the aggregate damages into a fund. It
would also award class counsel fees calculated to provide the
lawyer with appropriate incentive to invest optimally in litigating
the common questions determinative of aggregate liability and
damages, and ultimately deterrence.
' Consider the complex statistical and informational demands of the prevailing
standard for judging the reasonableness of product design. See Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability § 2 (ALI 1998). To judge a product defective, the court and
jury must find that:
[Tihe foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been re-
duced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by
the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of
distribution, and [that] the omission of the alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe.
Id. § 2(b). Indeed, this reasonableness (risk-utility balancing) test governs negligence
cases generally. See United States v Carroll Towing Co, 159 F2d 169, 173 (2d Cir 1947)
(setting out standard for negligence that weighs probability and magnitude of harm
against the cost of preventive measures). Applying the test requires courts to engage in
complicated fact-finding and make debatable policy judgments regarding the net benefits
of competing allocations of scarce social resources. The courts' role includes evaluating the
distributive consequences for individuals of varying wealth. Each case asks the court and
jury to weigh the relative benefits and costs of the product design in question against
those of competing designs, whether or not these are commercially available at the time of
sale. This task entails making a benefit-cost assessment of industry custom versus the
most advanced safety technology available or in development and determining whether an
alternative design was practicable, that is, whether consumers could afford the costs of
additional precautions. Because riskless products are generally unaffordable and often
impractical, if not impossible, to use for their intended purposes, judgments in product
design cases strike a balance along many dimensions that effectively raises some risks
while reducing others-for example, a safety latch on car doors designed to keep them
closed in a collision may limit egress in case of fire. For a recent judicial concession that
such decisions are beyond the capacity of courts in the standard civil system. See Pegram
v Herdrich, 530 US 211, 220-22 (2000) (recognizing that all HMO schemes raise some
risks while reducing others).
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At the second stage, the court would distribute the fund of
aggregate damages based on individualized trials or settlement
assessment of the non-common questions. Indeed, the mechanism
used to allocate compensation will result in the evaluation of the
full array of conventional claim-specific law, fact, and other liti-
gation variables that determine the relative recovery value of
claims in the standard market process. Mandatory Rule 23(b)(3)
class actions thus accommodate the anti-redistribution principle
because decoupling promotes the fundamentally crucial priority
for optimal deterrence in the first stage without prefiguring the
criteria and mode of distributing damages in the subsequent,
separate stage. Class action judgment for the aggregate tortious
or otherwise sanctionable loss suffices to motivate the mass pro-
ducer's ex ante investment in optimal precautions. How damages
are distributed among class members-whether averaged, allot-
ted by need, apportioned according to some other criterion, or not
distributed at all-is generally (with the exception of its effect on
plaintiff incentives) irrelevant to achieving deterrence. Thus,
class members could seek to individualize recoveries against the
fund in "mini trials" of the non-common questions prosecuted on
their behalf by class counsel or, by exercising the option to "inter-
vene as of right," they can personally choose and proceed through
their own counsel.
As in the standard market process, competition among coun-
sel for business and bargaining with clients would determine the
fees for representation, motivating counsel to invest optimally in
prosecuting claims on the non-common questions. Operating un-
der cost and free riding constraints on collective action in the
claims market, counsel will also aggregate claims for returns
from scale economy and invest in developing generalizable meth-
odologies of proof as well as discovery and evidence, such as eco-
nomic models for estimating lost income, bearing on the non-
common questions. To be sure, litigation of the non-common
questions entails costs and risks that will winnow down the
number and level of recoveries by class members. Many claims
will simply fail by default because their relatively low return
renders them unmarketable to class counsel or other competent
attorneys. However, because of the class action scale advantages
in the first stage prosecution of the common questions, the aver-
age expected recovery value of class members' claims will sub-
stantially exceed what they would be worth if prosecuted on a
fractionally aggregated basis in the standard market process. In
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any event, the anti-redistribution principle implies that the "luck
of the draw" should govern the distribution, number, and level of
recoveries. The decoupled mandatory Rule 23(b)(3) class action
fosters, with greater litigation effectiveness than the market al-
ternative, individual pursuit of maximum wealth. Yet, regardless
of how many class members recover and how much they indi-
vidually recover from the aggregate damage fund, the decoupled
determination and assessment of aggregate liability and damages
in the first stage assures that class counsel can fully exploit scale
economy and investment opportunities, negating the systemic
bias favoring mass producer defendants over plaintiffs and
courts, and consequently improving everyone's welfare by effec-
tuating the priority for optimal deterrence.
B. Solely Illicit Motives Prompt Opt-Out
The readily available decoupling design for implementing
Rule 23(b)(3) litigation class actions on a mandatory basis over-
rules the objection that opt-out is needed to serve the anti-
redistribution principle. Given well-motivated class counsel,
mandatory litigation class action makes everyone better off ex
ante by securing optimal deterrence, while fully comporting with
the anti-redistribution principle to enrich those with strong legal
claims ex post-achieving both results far more effectively than
would the alternative, standard market process.
However, if class action actually enables individuals to
maximize their wealth more effectively than the standard market
process, then it would seem unnecessary to make collectivization
mandatory. Self-interested class members would reject the option
to exit. This seeming paradox disappears on recalling the collec-
tive action costs and problems noted above. Despite the potential
for mutual gain from collective action, illicit inducements for
class members to opt out remain prevalent and forceful. The most
salient are deception by non-class counsel and free riding.
The class member is likely to become the victim of misrepre-
sentation by non-class counsel promoting services that the class
action has rendered otherwise unnecessary or unmarketable.
These attorneys might, for example, peddle the canard that "ag-
gregation will transfer money from high-value claimants to low-
value claimants-all paid from a common pot.""° Second, class
" See Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis, and Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within
the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 NYU L Rev 296, 326 (1996)
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members and non-class attorneys could team up to reap oppor-
tunistic gains. They might threaten opt-out to extract a dispro-
portionate share of the class action surplus as the price for join-
der. This ploy will increase costs and create holdout and other
bargaining problems, and if successful, would decrease average
per-claim recovery. Indeed, free riding presents the greater dan-
ger. The well-recognized prospect of free riding on collectively
produced work product that is a problem in the contexts of fed-
eral multi-district consolidation or non-mutual collateral estoppel
would also plague non-mandatory class action under Rule
23(b)(3). Class counsel will reduce the collective investment in
light of the lower net return resulting from free riding opt-outs,
thereby undermining optimal deterrence to make everyone worse
off ex ante. The Conference endorsement of the opportunity to
opt-out of class settlement greatly exacerbates the free riding
problem. Because settlement of a litigation class action will likely
occur after class counsel would have developed most, and possibly
all, of the common question work product in preparation for trial,
the second opt-out undermines the incentive for making this ma-
jor investment by diverting the returns to free riders.
III. OPT-OUT LACKS INSTRUMENTAL UTILITY
The prevailing rationales for allowing opt-out from a Rule
23(b)(3) class action are instrumental. In contrast to a deontologi-
cal conception of opt-out as an intrinsic good, regardless of its ef-
fects on individual welfare, the instrumental justification draws
on analytical and empirical appraisals of the benefits of allowing
opt-out. Thus, implicitly positing the anti-redistribution principle
as the test of class action "fairness," the Conference determined
that adding a second opportunity for opt-out at class settlement
would enable class members to maximize their individual claim-
related wealth by affording them a better-informed basis for com-
paring their respective anticipated recovery from and in the ab-
sence of class action." The foregoing argument demonstrates that
effectuation of the anti-redistribution principle does not depend
(relying on John Coffee's assertion in The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Bal-
ancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U Chi L Rev 877, 904-10
(1987)).
3 See Annie Hsia, Rule Changes for Class Actions Clear Hurdle: Plaintiffs stand to
get a second chance to opt out, Natl L J (Oct 2, 2002) available online at
<http'/www.bermanesq.com/pdf/NIJarticle.pdf> (visited Aug 26, 2003) (providing com-
ments from members of the rules committee).
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on opt-out, and thus does not entail sacrifice of the deterrence
priority.
This Part refutes other asserted instrumental needs for any
opt-out from a Rule 23(b)(3) class action. In particular, it re-
sponds to claims made by the Conference that the second opt-out
serves not only to alert the presiding court to potential "unfair-
ness" in the class action representation or structure, but also to
provide a market-process check against class counsel and the de-
fendant making a "sweetheart" settlement misappropriating the
claim-related wealth of absentee class members. These argu-
ments are often made to justify pre-certification opt-out, and, in-
deed, could be extended to support opt-out at any other point in
the process-for example, after summary judgment or class-wide
trial of the common questions.32 Advanced in the proceduralist
mode, these arguments never consider the adverse effects of opt-
out on the deterrence objective of mass production liability.
Moreover, allowing opt-out-that is, complete exit from the
class action to prosecute a claim on both common and non-
common questions in the standard market process-is neither
necessary nor even useful to address these problems, and indeed,
would prove counterproductive in several major respects.
The following shows that this conclusion holds for the most
salient concerns regarding class settlements. First, I evaluate the
need for and utility of opt-out in guarding against deficient class
representation negotiating class settlements, in particular the
danger that class counsel will settle all or some claims for less
than the "true" aggregate expected value because of a "sweet-
heart" or "kickback" deal, or because of risk aversion. I then con-
" While it might seem obvious that allowing opt-out late in the process, such as after
summary judgment, would encourage free riding, provision for late-stage opt-out may also,
if intervening court rulings dim class prospects, promote "one-way intervention," spawn-
ing a multiplicity of separate claims or even more class action filings. Proliferation of
claims distorts incentives not only of class counsel by eroding class action scale economy
and investment benefits, but also of the defendant by confronting it with multiple class
action applications. Essentially, depending on the number of independent applications for
class certification and level of probability of success (whether constant, rising, or even
declining), the chance of certifying the class cumulates over the number of possible appli-
cations-nearing certainty when the number is large-and therefore will exceed the true
(and presumed socially appropriate) probability of class certification. Thus, if the true
chance of a court exercising discretion to convene a class action is 50 percent and the
plaintiffs can apply twice, the cumulative probability of class certification is 75 percent (50
percent chance of certification on the first application plus 50 percent of a 50 percent
chance of certification on the second application). The court in In re Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc, Tires Products Liability Litigation, 2003 WL 21418413 (7t' Cir) appears to have inde-
pendently developed the same point.
[2003:
CURRENT ISSUES IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
sider the need for and utility of opt-out in the situations of bar-
gaining breakdown or otherwise that lead any given class mem-
ber to prefer going to "mini trial" rather than accepting the prof-
fered class settlement terms. This Part closes with a brief note on
the deontological justifications for opt-out.
A. Deficient Class Representation
1. The problem of class settlement abuse.
a) "Sweetheart" deals. Appropriately structured fee awards
for class counsel fully align attorney and class interests, render-
ing opt-out policing unnecessary. In litigation class actions, struc-
turing class counsel's fee to motivate an optimal investment and
deter "sweetheart" deals is a straightforward matter of basing the
fee award on the attorney's opportunity cost of class settlement,
which is the attorney's forgone return from going to class trial
rather then settling.33 In short, to align the interests of class
counsel and class, class counsel's fee from the class settlement
must not exceed the share of the class recovery that class counsel
would have received in return for winning a judgment at class
trial.34 If the fractional share of a class settlement is no greater
than the fractional share of the proceeds received from going to
trial, then in general class counsel will have no incentive to seek
less from class settlement or from class trial than the class mem-
Bruce L. Hay and David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements in
Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 Notre Dame L Rev 1377, 1394-98 (2000). The
caveat "all else held constant" applies with special force here because the implicit assump-
tion of judicial fee-setting competence is contestable. The proposed restructured fee-award
eliminates the need for courts to review bargaining setup, process, and substantive out-
come for signs of deficient representation. Even in the absence of class counsel and defen-
dant machinations, courts lack the resources to gather, evaluate, and apply the informa-
tion entailed by such review-for example, in auditing the class settlement to assure that
it provides the maximum expected aggregate net judgment value of the class claim. This
determination depends, as do all other assessments of the class settlement, on the courts
accurately estimating the optimal level of investment by class counsel that maximizes net
benefit for the class as a whole and the subgroups and individuals comprising it. It is
doubtful that a judge could effectively approximate, let alone replicate, the analysis and
judgments of appropriately motivated class counsel. The problem for fee-setting, of course,
is precisely that the court must determine not only the optimal investment level, but also
the optimal reward to motivate that investment. Auctioning the class action (not the posi-
tion of class counsel) represents a promising means of overcoming many defects in the
process of civil liability law enforcement, including the daunting, probably insurmount-
able, informational barriers to effective judicial regulation of class action. For further
discussion, see note 42.
See id at 1392-98.
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bers' claims are worth. That is, self-interested class counsel will
maximize profits by "holding out" for class settlement that gives
the class members the full value of their claims. Accordingly, the
court can eliminate any incentive to settle for too little by regulat-
ing the attorney's fee in such a way as to ensure that the attor-
ney's fractional share of a settlement is no greater than his frac-
tional share of the recovery would have been had the case gone to
trial.
The point may be illustrated with a simple numerical exam-
ple. Assume that the class's claims as a group are worth one hun-
dred million dollars and that class counsel will receive a fee equal
to 10 percent of the class recovery if the case goes to trial. (For
simplicity's sake, assume that class counsel is risk neutral and
that going to trial and settling are equally costly for class coun-
sel.) Then the class counsel will refuse any settlement offer that
gives the class less than one hundred million dollars, provided
that the attorney collects no more than 10 percent of the settle-
ment amount. To see this, observe that in this example going to
trial will yield class counsel ten million dollars. If class counsel is
allowed only 10 percent of the settlement recovery, then the set-
tlement must be at least one hundred million dollars for the at-
torney to match the fee from trial. Note, however, that if the fee
for settlement is greater than 10 percent, class counsel will per-
haps be willing to settle for less than one hundred million dol-
lars.35
As this example suggests, the court can prevent class counsel
from having an incentive to settle for less than the class's claims
are worth by appropriately regulating counsel's distributive share
of the settlement amount. To do this, the court must determine
the fractional share that class counsel would receive in the event
the case were tried and the class were to recover at trial, and ap-
ply that share to any recovery from settlement. Notably, the court
does not need to know the actual amount that the class would
' This example assumes the usual situation in which class counsel recovers financial
outlays for class trial from the judgment in addition to a percentage or lodestar assess-
ment compensating the attorney's expenditures of time and costs of risk-bearing. It should
be noted that this conventional allocation of payments to class (or for that matter, sepa-
rate) action counsel, while providing the lawyer with the appropriate motive to hold out
for a class settlement offer at least equal to the expected class judgment from trial, imbues
the class with an excessive preference for settlement over trial. To correct this distorted
incentive, class counsel should, all else being equal, have final say over the timing and
terms of settlement. The proposal for structuring class counsel's fee award to avoid sweet-
heart deals is developed in Hay and Rosenberg, 75 Notre Dame L Rev at 1394-98 (cited
in note 33).
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receive at trial; thus in this example, it is not important for the
court to know that the value of the class's claims is one hundred
million dollars. All that the court needs to determine is the frac-
tional share of the recovery that the counsel would receive of the
proceeds from trial-in this example, 10 percent.
b) "Kickback" deals. Class counsel, however well motivated
by the court-awarded fee, may still be tempted to manipulate and
otherwise sub-optimally prosecute the class claim or an element
of it in return for a "kickback" from the defendant or an illicitly
benefited sub-group of class members. It is important to distin-
guish kickback agreements with the defendant from those made
with some agent representing a sub-group of class members. In-
tra-class kickback schemes may violate the "default" principle of
anti-redistribution, but generally they represent only wealth
transfers that have no correlation with enhancement of individ-
ual welfare. 6 Optimal deterrence is the priority and that goal is,
all else being equal, unaffected by the intra-class distribution of
claim-related wealth. In other words, outside of some fetish for
zero-tolerance of deviation from the default anti-redistribution
principle, there is no compelling reason to expend legal resources
to monitor and prevent intra-class kickback arrangements. Kick-
back deals between class counsel and the defendant, however,
usually result in the latter paying less than the aggregate tor-
tious or otherwise sanctionable loss, and thus, to the extent the
firm predicts this route of escape ex ante, in underdeterrence.
Yet the threat posed even by such kickback deals is over-
stated. Given that the supervising court sets class counsel's fee
award, direct side payment represents the most likely means of
kickback. However, while direct side payments of money from
defendants or an agent for some subgroup of class members to
class counsel cannot be ruled out, the incidence probably is very
low, if not negligible. In any event, disclosure requirements, court
surveillance, and the difficulty of concealing the transaction pro-
' The "intra-class" scheme under consideration differs from situations in which class
counsel and defendant implement a sweetheart deal by short-changing some class mem-
bers relative to others. The illicit beneficiaries are class counsel and defendant, not the
unaffected class members. This problem is alleged to occur or at least arise frequently in
class settlements encompassing a large number of "future" loss claims, for example, by
under-stating their aggregate expected value. In contrast, intra-class "sweetheart" deals
generally do not involve defendant, but rather are confined to (mis)allocating the aggre-
gate settlement payout among competing factions of class members. (Defendant's partici-
pation would raise deterrence questions.) Moreover, it is difficult to imagine any realistic
conditions under which such a deal could occur, and to my knowledge at least, no one has
specifically alleged let alone proven its occurrence.
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vide considerable disincentive. Temptation to make such an ar-
rangement is largely if not wholly overcome by the courts' requir-
ing class counsel to disclose fully and continuously (throughout
the process of obtaining and distributing any class judgment or
settlement recovery) agreements with anyone relating to the
case.37 Additional disincentives for making such arrangements
include professional discipline, contempt, criminal and civil pen-
alties (possibly involving tax fraud), and other formal as well as
informal sanctions (such as loss of business credit and reputa-
tion). There is, moreover, a further powerful deterrent to kick-
backs, even assuming some chance of concealment. Because
courts would not enforce the agreement, the parties lack a credi-
ble means of committing themselves to the deal; the party who
"performs" first would have no legal recourse to compel perform-
ance by the other party.
2. The problem of risk aversion.
Attorney risk aversion presents another potential source of
defective representation but no need for policing by opt-out. A
long-standing supposition holds that class counsel is likely to be
especially averse to risking the class claim at trial. (Here, I refer
to the fear of loss of a substantial amount of the attorney's
wealth, and not to the more particular concern about betting eve-
rything, all-or-nothing, on a single class-wide verdict. The latter
is often characterized as setting up "blackmail" settlements, al-
though many erroneously claim that defendants are the exclusive
or even the systematically likely "victims" of such excessive bar-
gaining leverage.)38 It is posited that the attorney might well pre-
" Side payments are quite difficult to conceal given court-ordered reporting, pangs of
conscience, and the nagging fear of detection among lawyers with knowledge of or involved
in the deal. Of the many lawyers and others likely to be involved in the collusive arrange-
ment, there is a good chance that at least one will truthfully respond to the judicial inquir-
ies rather than chance severe punishment. Blackmail by those who know about the side
payment would probably make the deal unprofitable.
See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc, 51 F3d at 1299 (finding that defendants con-
front a class action 'blackmail' effect that "forc[es them] ... to stake their companies on
the outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle
even if they have no legal liability"). See also Hay and Rosenberg, 75 Notre Dame L Rev
at 1392-98 (cited in note 33) (questioning the purported class action "blackmail" facing
defendants and proposing multi-class trials as the solution). It should also be noted that,
because class-wide trial normally determines common questions relating to the prima
facie case of liability, only plaintiffs face the prospect of catastrophic loss of a single all-or-
nothing trial verdict. While defendant also faces the prospect of an unfavorable verdict on
class-wide liability, including common questions relating to defenses, in contrast to plain-
tiffs, it generally incurs actual loss, if any, on assessment of damages, which typical bifur-
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fer settling for a certain, if lower, return on a sizable pre-trial in-
vestment rather than gambling on losing everything at trial.
Sweetheart settlements, Judge Henry Friendly surmised, result
from an inverse relation between class counsel's increasing in-
vestment of time, money, and other resources in preparation for
class trial and the decreasing resolve to go to trial.39 Because of
risk aversion, the certainty of a fee in class settlement becomes
all the more attractive to class counsel with the looming prospect
of trial and "loss of years of costly effort by himself and his
staff."0 Obviously, if this hypothesis were accurate, then there
would be reason for concern, because settlements for less than
the expected value of the aggregate sanctionable loss to the class
threaten the deterrence value of class action.
However, there is no logical basis and, today at least, little
practical need for special concern that risk aversion will lead
class counsel to fold on the eve of class trial in fear of losing a ma-
jor pre-trial investment of time and money. To be sure, class
counsel's pre-trial investment typically entails many millions of
dollars and requires thousands of hours for research, dispositive
motions, discovery, advice and preparation of experts, and other
work in developing common questions and proof for class trial.
But experienced, adequately financed, and competent class coun-
sel would not undertake these burdens unless, judged from the ex
ante perspective, the anticipated fee award exceeds the total ex-
pected litigation investment-pre-trial as well as trial-including
the costs of bearing the risk of losing. In short, the actual expen-
diture of resources in preparation for class trial should not affect
class counsel's calculation of costs and benefits respecting the
choice to settle or go to trial.
Indeed, in settlement negotiations on the eve of trial, class
counsel would regard pre-trial expenditures as irretrievable,
cation methods relegate to the post-common question phase of separate, individualized
"mini trials." In other words, in most class actions the defendant never stakes everything,
all-or-nothing, but rather ultimately risks paying some aggregate amount represented as
the sum of any judgments rendered against it in a series of independent separate trials of
plaintiffs' respective individual damage claims. Bifurcation also may increase defendants'
asymmetric advantage further by reducing the rate of jury findings of liability. See Zeisel
and Callahan, Split trials and time saving: a statistical analysis, 76 Harvard Law Review,
1606 (1963) (noting significant reduction in liability findings in bifurcated versus unitary
trials, though juries in the former tended to award higher damages). Similar results were
reported in Bordens and Horowitz, Mass tort civil litigation: The impact of procedural
changes on jury decisions, 73 Judicature 22 (1988).
Saylor v Lindsley, 456 F2d 896, 900-01 (2d Cir 1972).
o Id at 901.
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sunk costs. Consequently, at this point the hazards of trial should
be of less concern to the attorney than they were originally, be-
fore undertaking the case and making those expenditures. Hav-
ing made the pre-trial investment, class counsel rationally com-
pares the expected recovery from class trial to the incremental
(though substantial) costs of proceeding to trial. That resulting
ratio will likely yield an expected net return from class trial that
is far more favorable than the comparison of the expected trial
recovery to total litigation costs that class counsel considered suf-
ficiently profitable to commence the class action in the first
place.4
Moreover, courts are well situated to evaluate the financing,
experience, portfolio diversification, and other factors relating to
class counsel's risk-bearing costs and capacity. The most difficult
problem for courts will be choosing among two or more well-
heeled and -hedged firms. In this regard, there is no dearth of
adequately prepared lawyers. Whatever may have been true in
Friendly's time or even a decade ago, these days class counsel is
usually capable of marshalling the economic wherewithal for ef-
fective prosecution of large-scale class actions. The segment of the
plaintiffs' bar that specializes in such litigation is growing, but it
continues to be dominated by large, corporately structured, mega-
or multi-firm organizations that compete against each other for
"market shares" of classable claims in the separate action proc-
ess, and ultimately for appointments as class counsel in trial and
settlement class actions. These "entrepreneurial lawyers" amass
the huge resources necessary for adequately funding and make
arrangements necessary for effective diversification of the risks of
litigating a complex class claim through trial in a trial class ac-
tion or their large respective shares of the classable claims
through trial in separate actions.
To the extent that courts require further assurance against
excessive risk aversion, they can authorize class counsel to sell
his or her stake in the case to another attorney, presumably bet-
ter prepared to shoulder the burdens of the litigation. Typically,
the need for buy-out will not arise because profit-maximizing
4 Settlement rates for class and separate actions are comparably high and, all else
being equal, suggest no excessive propensity on the part of class counsel to forgo trial.
The "sunk cost" point applies, of course, to class counsel's marginal investment at
any stage of the process. Beyond hoping to recover that expenditure in pre trial settle-
ment, class counsel has no necessary bargaining power to extract the payment and has
only one means of recouping the loss: credibly in threatening trial.
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class counsel has a natural incentive to merge or form a joint ven-
ture with such an attorney. More generally, courts could auction
the class actions prior to certification, after some period of pre-
trial development (corresponding to multi-district consolidation),
or prior to approval of class settlement.42
42 Class action auction has a number of other functional advantages. Critics argue,
however, that assigning class actions to the highest bidder rather than to the lawyer who
first discovered and filed the case or to class counsel, whose work pressured the defendant
to settle, would discourage investment in pre-suit detection and pretrial development
efforts. Moreover, there is a danger of collusive bidding and even of potential bidders effec-
tively forming a single firm to become a monopolist. This is not the occasion for detailed
discussion of these design questions, but several points should be noted. First, class ac-
tions are not unique in posing these problems, while they are unique in motivating the
optimal investment on the common questions. Claim finders and developers of cases in the
standard market process often lose of transfer control to more effective counsel, and in
many fields, such as air crash cases, the supply of legal representation is highly concen-
trated. Given this reality, it is doubtful that the opportunity costs of class action auction
exceed the benefits of the optimal class action investment.
Second, these problems have ready solutions. Finders and others developing claims
preliminarily often gain rewards for successful effort by selling their interest in the claim
to more effective attorneys, for example through referral and franchise arrangements. If
need be, courts should be able to set the appropriate reward for claim finders and develop-
ers, just as they do for the class counsel that prosecutes the class action to final judgment
by trial or settlement. Compare Proposed Amendment to Rule 23 authorizing court to
designate (and presumably compensate) "interim counsel to act on behalf of the putative
class before determining whether to certify the action as a class action." Also, the court
can structure the auction so that bidders must simultaneously submit bids to the court
stating the amount they would pay the class and to the claim finder or developer to re-
ward his or her effort. Under this system, the court would be required, while the finder or
developer would be free, respectively, to accept the highest dollar bid. That is, under this
"double acceptance" system bidders would submit two offers, first, to the court specifying
the aggregate net damages for payment to the class, and second, to the finder or developer
specifying the reward. The commitment feature of this design avoids holdout and bargain-
ing breakdown: the court must accept the highest bid for class recovery. Thus while the
finder or developer is free to demand any amount, he or she would recognize that the
highest bid reward may detract from the corresponding bid of class recovery to the court.
The high bid to the finder will be rendered nugatory, because some other bidder, offering
less to the finder, can offer more to the court and because the court is bound to accept the
highest bid it receives. Thus, for a firm to win a competitive auction, it must not only
possess the capacity and commitment to invest optimally in the class claim, but also must
allocate optimally the expected recovery in offers to the court and finder or developer.
Because the court must accept the highest dollar bid, the claim finder or developer cannot
hold out for more than the cost of his or her effort. And finally, because of the large num-
ber of qualified attorneys and sources of financing, bid rigging, oligopoly, and certainly
monopoly are unlikely prospects. In any event, given the ex ante preference for optimal
deterrence, the prospect of monopoly law enforcement, even if real, poses no systematic
problem at all. The monopoly law enforcer has every incentive to profit maximize, which
occurs only if it optimally invests in prosecuting the class claim. Courts also possess stan-
dard means to detect, deter, and remediate any socially detrimental monopolistic behav-
ior.
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3. Opt-out as a remedy for deficient representation.
a) Utility. Opt-out is not only unnecessary in light of read-
ily available non-opt-out remedies for deficient representation,
but, in any event, allowing exit would be of dubious utility. The
following evaluates the utility of opt-out as a means first to deter
and detect sweetheart or kickback deals, and second to remedy
the problem of class counsel risk aversion.
The key to making opt-out a credible and effective sanction
for class counsel duplicity is information. But, in the absence of
judicially compelled disclosure, it is doubtful that class members
could obtain adequate information on their own. Of course, those
with inside information might reveal a sweetheart or kickback
agreement to class members voluntarily, or, more realistically,
for an appropriate reward (to motivate detection and reporting
efforts) such as a fee or being designated to replace class counsel
by the court. But there is no reason why the insider volunteering
information would prefer communicating with class members in a
costly effort to provoke opt-outs rather than with the court to
have class counsel investigated, and if found delinquent, disci-
plined or replaced. More realistically, there is no reason why the
insider seeking a reward would prefer soliciting payment from
numerous, more or less dispersed class members, incurring the
obvious collective action problems and costs involved, rather than
from the court that can fully and efficiently exact payment as
part of the fine levied against offending class counsel and defen-
dant, and, when appropriate, as a tax on benefited class mem-
bers. This mode of correcting class settlement abuse also avoids
the enormous costs of the "whistleblower" informing and consult-
ing with class members about the problem and ultimately solicit-
ing their agreement to become clients and exercise their preroga-
tive to opt-out. Moreover, even if class members could effectively
elicit the information themselves, there is no reason why they
would on their own-or, indeed, on non-class counsel's advice-
opt out and thus forfeit the optimal investment benefits of class
action once the illicit deal was uncovered and negated. Class
members can simply report their suspicions or discoveries to the
court; class members' reward might come in the form of a fine paid
by class counsel or of a malpractice liability judgment against the
attorney.
This reporting process also avoids the judicial cost of drawing
inferences from the rate of opt-out to detect the possible existence
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of some nefarious deal. These costs are greatly compounded by
the dubiousness of the judicial enterprise itself. Opt-out is never
a reliable signal of deficient representation because perfectly rea-
sonable class settlements (like all settlements) provide the aver-
age net value of alternative probable trial outcomes and other
relevant future events. The incentive to opt out thus exists for
class members who, because of their excessive optimism or be-
cause some contingent event has turned out in plaintiffs' favor,
appraise their claims at above-average value.43 In short, opt-out is
superfluous and wasteful of legal resources as a means of policing
against class settlement abuse.
Similarly, opt-out probably will have little or no effect in de-
terring or remedying deficient representation due to class counsel
risk aversion. Again, the key is information. Because of the likely
surplus value generated by the collective, though deficient, in-
vestment on the common questions, it is doubtful that any class
members will perceive any shortfall. Nor is it likely that they will
know more than the court about the financial and other relevant
circumstances of class counsel's risk-bearing costs and capacity.
While class counsel's debilitation may be significant, it is unlikely
to be patent or obvious. Moreover, as demonstrated above, there
is no assurance that any fraction of the class will have sufficient
incentive to make the optimal investment that is necessary to
determine the aggregate expected value of the class recovery for
comparison against the anticipated recovery from class counsel's
deficient representation. Even if class members were able to
measure the differential in expected aggregate recoveries, there
is no reason to opt out. The attorney who can discover and dem-
onstrate the shortfall can simply provide the court with the in-
formation, and in all probability reap the reward of being ap-
pointed new class counsel. Indeed, unless a competing class ac-
tion were convened, in most cases freedom to prosecute claims in
the standard market process would not increase class members'
chances of becoming wealthier, especially if the court learned of
the risk aversion problem and appointed new class counsel to cor-
rect it. Even assuming all class members opted out, the likely
result would be fractional aggregation yielding lower net recover-
" See Rosenberg, 115 Harv L Rev at 888-89 (cited in note 6) (explaining that because
class settlements reflect the weighted average of contingent variables, opt-out will gener-
ate "false positives" of class members exiting from a perfectly reasonable settlement as
well as "false negatives" of class members induced by litigation costs to take a class set-
tlement payout that is tainted by class counsel's self-dealing).
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ies on average than would a class action prosecuted by margin-
ally risk averse class counsel.
b) Cost. Opt-out entails two types of cost: law enforcement
and collective action. Law enforcement cost refers primarily to
information problems incurred in the appropriate use of opt-out
to police class counsel's representation. In particular (assuming
the prevailing rule disallowing opt-out classes, that is, restricting
each dissident class member to opting out solely on an individual
basis, and not as (or through) a "class representative" of dissi-
dent, absentee class members), recruitment of opt-outs will in-
volve considerable expense for dissident counsel and the court to
communicate necessary information to class members. Plaintiffs
should be supplied with the basis for making reasonably informed
decisions on basic questions such as the existence of a kickback
deal or excessive risk aversion, the relative benefits and risks of
exiting the class versus remaining in and relying on objections,
and, if the former route is chosen, the best counsel to prosecute
the claim in the standard market process. The complexity of both
the information and questions indicates that far more than sum-
mary notifications and standardized exchanges is needed. Given
the meager (at best) utility of opt-out in policing class counsel,
these costs would seem to be the decisive reasons for disallowing
exit and instead employing the promise of court-awarded fees to
spur collective investment by objectors in detecting and reporting
deficient representation.
Collective action costs primarily relate to the adverse effects
on deterrence from the opportunity created by opt-out for strate-
gically motivated exit: specifically, as discussed above, class
members being deceived by fee-seeking attorneys or joining with
those attorneys to profit from free riding. The priority of optimal
deterrence implies general preclusion of opt-out because it rarely
if ever achieves any benefit in preventing deficient representation
to offset the loss of the deterrent value of civil liability. Indeed,
these collective action costs would persist even were opt-out per-
fectly effective, for example, in deterring kickback deals, and
therefore costless to enforce because no such deal would ever be
made. The only solution to such collective action problems is for
the court to charge opt-outs an appropriately prorated share of
class counsel's fee related to investing in the development of the
common questions. Other, administratively expensive monitoring
and regulatory checks on opportunistic opt-out might also require
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Rule 68-type44 offer-of-settlement restrictions.45 As such, opt-out is
unlikely to maximize individual welfare by minimizing the sum of
accident costs.
B. Bargaining Breakdown
Class settlements, like litigation settlements generally,
rarely incur significant difficulties in compromising claims on
terms of mutual satisfaction to the defendant and particular class
member. Generally, the parties prefer to average out their differ-
ences over the likely result of trial of the non-common questions,
rather than bear the costs and risks of trial to further individual-
ize a given class member's recovery. However, asymmetries in
information and evaluation, excessive optimism regarding trial
outcomes, and other factors affecting the parties' respective dis-
positions to settle may result in bargaining holdouts, and in some
cases to bargaining breakdowns and demand for trial on the non-
common questions that determine relative, individual recovery.
However, no matter how well motivated class counsel's rep-
resentation and the resulting aggregate class settlement, some
class members may disagree with the individualized assessment
and settlement offer of their claims. Bargaining breakdowns lead-
ing to trial are rare in the standard market process46 and no more
likely to occur in the context of class action. 7 Yet, while individu-
alization is unnecessary for deterrence purposes (except for indi-
vidual deterrence purposes, such as, reducing payouts to account
for a class member's contributory negligence), imposing class set-
tlement terms in disregard of a class member's desire for trial on
the non-common questions might contravene the anti-redistribution
principle-broadly read to afford class members the option they
would have had in the standard market process of rejecting a set-
tlement offer and going for broke to maximize claim-related
FRCP 68.
" See David Rosenberg, Mass Torts and Collective Judicial Procedures, in 2 ALI
Reporters' Study, Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury: Approaches to Le-
gal and Institutional Change 383, 436-37 (1991) (suggesting several preconditions that
should be satisfied before allowing opt-out).
" See, for example, Adam Liptak, Judges Seek to Ban Secret Settlements in South
Carolina, NY Times Al (Sept 2, 2002) (reporting that in the past year, the federal district
court resolved 3,821 civil cases by settlement and only thirty-five by trial to verdict).
Of course, the possibility of free riding on the common questions work product
precludes the direct equation of a class member's rejection of a litigation class settlement
with a plaintiffs rejection of a separate claim settlement in the standard market process.
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wealth.48 Nevertheless, opt-out is unnecessary to satisfy this trial
demand. That demand can be fully met within the ambit of a
Rule 23(b)(3) litigation class action.
Recall that opt-out entails unconditional exit from the class
action to prosecute a claim on all questions-common and non-
common-in the standard market process.49
The cost of opt-out, as discussed above, is loss of the collec-
tive, optimal investment that maximizes the deterrence value of
adjudicating mass production claims. Of course, class members ex
post have little or no concern about that cost. However, wealth-
maximizing class members are concerned about the loss of the
collective optimal investment. That investment maximizes aggre-
gate net recovery on the common question component of the claims,
and, therefore, the net recovery everyone receives. Wealth-
maximizing class members would prefer to retain collective opti-
mal investment on the common questions, while preserving the
option of trial on the non-common questions in the event that
they disagree with the individualized settlement offer.
Rule 23(b)(3) can accommodate this preference by affording
dissatisfied class members the option to reject the individualized
settlement offer and demand trial on the non-common questions
against the aggregate fund established for deterrence purposes.
" Assuming a random distribution of high and low settlement errors, the effect of
imposing class settlement is merely one of wealth transfer among class members. Because
such transfer does not necessarily distort the deterrence value of class action, it has no
relevant bearing on individual well-being ex ante.
49 The following diagram depicts the class action settlement with opt-out:
(1) (2)
' Class member stays in class action for individual-
Class Settlement ized settlement payout
Class member opts out to prosecute claim on
common and non-common questions in standard
market process
(1) The defendant and the class members reach an aggregate class settlement agreement
establishing a schedule or process for determining and distributing individualized dam-
ages to class members.
(2) Before court approval of the class settlement, class members can choose either to re-
main in the class action to receive damages according to schedule or process for individu-
alizing their respective recoveries, or to exercise opt-out to prosecute the claim on all ques-
tions-common and non-common-in the standard market process.
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The Rule provides for such "mini trials" in the absence of settle-
ment. Under the Rule, a class member can intervene "as of right"
and have personally chosen counsel conduct the trial."°
If an unusually high rate of bargaining breakdown and high
demand for "mini trials" overburdens the court's docket, Rule 23
provides a solution. The court can order class treatment only of
the common questions,5' render judgment approving the aggre-
gate class settlement of those questions and awarding related
fees to class counsel, and also approving a class settlement
schedule or process for individualizing class members' recoveries.
Class members who reject the individualized settlement "offer"
can file claims against the settlement fund for "mini trials" of the
non-common questions in any otherwise appropriate jurisdiction
and venue, federal or state.
C. Note on Deontological Justification for Opt-Out
Typically declared in question-begging and foreclosing moral-
istic terms, the deontological justification for opt-out lacks intel-
lectual coherence as applied to mass production risk cases." To
The following diagram depicts the class action with "mini trial" option:
(1) (2)
Cls-etlmn Class member Accepts Individualized
ClassSettlmentSettlement Offer
Class member Refuses Individualized Settlement
Offer and Demands "Mini Trial" On Non-
Common Questions
(1) The defendant and the class members reach an aggregate class settlement agreement
establishing a schedule or process for determining and distributing individualized dam-
ages to class members.
(2) Class member accepts individualized settlement offer or demands a "mini trial" on non-
common questions.
See FRCP Rule 23(c)(4)(A).
The question begging starts with the very suggestion of "plaintiff autonomy," pre-
sumably implying an individualistic conception of a claimant actually or at least poten-
tially proceeding by separate action independently of any other present or future claimant.
The condition of independence defines the essence of "autonomy": that each plaintiff pur-
sues his or her own interests through litigation without impairing (or appropriating) the
interests of others. But the nature of mass production renders this conception implausible;
the interests of everyone, ex post as well as ex ante, constitute a unity that can be pursued
individually only at the expense of the whole and everyone comprising it. Thus, as I have
shown, self-exclusion from the aggregate enables the mass production defendant to exploit
asymmetric investment opportunities that would thwart deterrence objectives making
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the extent that this justification does not operate merely as a
proxy for assuring optimal deterrence, but rather asserts a "good"
superior to or independent of individual welfare, it is a prescrip-
tion for making everyone worse off. The following critique focuses
on the "day-in-court" rubric, which Supreme Court rhetoric has
recently given particular prominence to and which serves as a
general catchall for related and similar concepts of "plaintiff
autonomy" and "corrective justice."'
It is said that there is a "deep rooted historic tradition that
everyone should have his own day in court.""' Those who invoke
that tradition merely assert its existence, even in the face of a
large amount of evidence to the contrary, and usually ignore the
need to give it content, practical or otherwise. Despite the im-
perative tone, no guarantee exists that a party to an accident will
actually get to court, let alone to trial. Rather, in relying almost
entirely on the market to allocate access, the principle tolerates,
often in its name and generally in the operation of the tort sys-
everyone worse off ex ante, desires of all seeking maximum claim-related wealth ex post,
and demand, ex ante and ex post, for the benefits-often life-sustaining--of mass produc-
tion processes, products, and services. Of course, mandatory aggregation precludes the
preference, however unreal and practically unrealizable, for going it alone. However,
unless the market can supply those preferences without undermining the collective goods
of deterrence and mass production, I regard subordination of "plaintiff autonomy" as nec-
essary given its empirically demonstrable adverse effects on individual welfare. But the
unity of mass production deprives the concept of "plaintiff autonomy" of any claim to intel-
lectual coherence. Thus, it is the actual or anticipated filing of even one additional sepa-
rate action that enables defendant to exploit asymmetric investment opportunities against
the first claimant, litigation power the defendant would not have but for the second filing.
The actual or anticipated filing of each new separate action further increases the
defendant's investment advantage against all other claimants who filed or will file sepa-
rate actions or have already aggregated their claims. Similarly, opt-out by the first class
member for a separate action confers the greatest marginal advantage on the defendant
against the class as well as the exiting class member, and with each succeeding opt-out,
defendant's litigation marginal power increases (though at a decreasing rate) over all
plaintiffs. The "plaintiff autonomy" enterprise has more serious problems than intellectual
incoherence; for, even assuming logical boundaries to insulate the interests from impair-
ment or appropriation ex post, it must contrive an explanation for insisting that the law
operate to harm the well being of everyone ex ante.
" Diana Moses and I are preparing a paper questioning the prevailing normative and
"individualistic" interpretation of Aristotle's conception of corrective justice. See, for ex-
ample, Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law at 56-58 (Harvard 1995). On the basis
of Moses's close analysis of the language, structure, and socio-historical context of Aris-
totle's Nicomachean Ethics, we find no substantial support for claims that an individualis-
tic "right-duty" or "bi-polar" relationship between plaintiff and defendant is required by or
essential to the concept of corrective justice. See Aristotle, 2 Nicomachean Ethics, in Jona-
than Barnes, ed, 2 The Complete Works of Aristotle at 1781-97 (Princeton 1984).
Ortiz v Fibreboard Corp, 527 US 815, 846 (1999) (citations omitted).
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tem, the exclusion of many if not most claims from court, because
the parties cannot afford the high costs of litigation."
Indeed, plaintiffs treat civil litigation largely as economic
theory would predict; namely, they seek to maximize claim-
related wealth. The supposed preference of litigants to "tell their
own story" over increasing their net recovery is belied by the fact
that upwards of 98 percent of triable cases settle.56 Nor do we ob-
serve anyone exiting from market organized aggregates of mass
production claims to proceed independently by separate action,
let alone the large-scale or complete unraveling of these aggre-
Rational choice theory, which predicts that individuals prefer ex ante to minimize
the sum of accident costs, finds overwhelming empirical support in the tremendous an-
nual expenditures on the legal system to prevent and replace accident loss. Of course,
mass tort plaintiffs sometimes go to trial and in some cases go it alone. Their conduct is
best explained, however, not by the desire for a "day in court," but by a more robust
motive: sheer ex post wealth maximization. The plaintiff goes to trial because of failure
to settle, or the plaintiff goes it alone to profit from free riding. Despite its moral preten-
sions, the "day-in-court" concept guarantees nothing that money cannot buy. Market
forces determine access to the tort system, and the market provides telling information
about individuals' willingness to pay for a day in court. Indeed, the high costs and risks
of litigation exclude many potential tort claims and compel virtually all of the rest to
settle. The increasingly prevalent pre-litigation agreements by potential plaintiffs to
subrogate future claims to their insurers or to submit claims to arbitration provide fur-
ther evidence of potential plaintiffs' willingness to forgo their "day in court."
' Some opponents of mandatory class action also attribute supervening value to
class action opt-out, suggesting that plaintiff autonomy is a good in itself. They fail to
consider that the choice between exit and no-exit class action should, like any choice
among competing designs of the legal system, depend on their relative effects on indi-
vidual welfare ex ante. As I have shown above, this way of thinking is a prescription for
making everyone worse off. Giving independent weight to class action opt-out regardless
of its effect in raising the sum of accident costs depreciates the individual's expected
welfare as a matter of course.
The "autonomy" espoused by the proponents of class action opt-out reflects a
narrow, unworldly, and professionally self-serving conception of how individuals might
enhance their well-being through self-determination. Aside from equating self-
determination with the esoteric and rather fanciful "freedom" of an individual of ordi-
nary expertise and income to take control of litigation, the concept excludes every con-
flicting expression or understanding of individual autonomy from consideration. While
hypothesizing that an individual may derive value from controlling litigation, proponents
of plaintiff autonomy give no weight to the mast-tying choices an individual would have
made ex ante to secure the most basic goods of mass tort liability-effective deterrence
and insurance of accident risk-which safeguard real autonomy, indeed health and life,
ex post.
"Autonomy" arguments of this kind follow the deeply rutted path of conventional
judicial and scholarly "proceduralist" thinking on matters of civil liability that generally
neglects the effects that rules structuring ex post litigation have on individuals' ex ante
behavior and well-being. Scholars who invoke the typically vague and empirically unsub-
stantiated virtues of plaintiff autonomy surely benefit, as do adherents to the procedural-
ist mode in general, from ignoring ex ante consequences. Recognizing these consequences
reveals the hard reality behind these scholars' metaphysical incantations: increased acci-
dent costs that make everyone worse off.
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gates that exit in any degree could trigger.57 Most significantly,
mass production claims are not prosecuted as separate actions:
all but free riders capitalizing on others' work product are ag-
gregated (albeit fractionally) for en masse representation. The
inference fairly drawn from this evidence is that the absence of
greater mandatory collectivization in the marketplace is not for
lack of demand, but rather, as previously discussed, because of
standard collective action problems and costs. Having a "day in
court" seems of interest only to academic lawyers.58
Beyond lack of evidence of ex post demand for a "day in
court," the concept also lacks coherence to the extent it contem-
plates providing an individualized accounting of legal rights,
wrongs, and remedies. Such an accounting is premised on an a
priori construct of some discrete, situationally specific "right-
duty" relationship existing ex ante between the prospective plain-
tiff and the defendant that defines whether and to what extent
harm suffered by the former should be deemed having been
"wrongfully inflicted" by and hence the responsibility ("fault") of
the latter. The system would thus accord the parties a full oppor-
tunity to present particularized proof of the terms and conditions
of the individual ex ante relationship and to have the judgment
measure out and pronounce the exact ex post degree of wrong
done and suffered thereby.
But whatever might be said about its account of legal reality
in general, the conception of an individual "right-duty" relation-
ship amounts to complete fantasy in mass production risk cases.
Mass production precautions, like its processes and goods, secure
welfare-enhancing scale economies and investment opportunities
through cost-benefit projections and implemental designs that
address the at-risk population in the aggregate, statistically and
" Unraveling-in principle, compete disintegration-of claim aggregates is implied by
the fact that increasing aggregation of mass production claims increases marginal ex-
pected damages at a decreasing-yet, still positive-rate and therefore decreasing aggre-
gation decreases marginal expected damages at a diminishing rate. It should be noted
that unraveling-assuming it occurred-would not necessarily signify a preference for a
"day in court" as opposed to proceeding by aggregate means. The exit of succeeding claims
would at base express nothing more than that the preceding or prospective exit of others
has so far diminished the marginal benefits from aggregate litigation as to make it
worthwhile to opt out for the marginal "autonomy" gain. For those in the aggregate, the
prospect of its continuous unraveling leaves them with little (and ultimately nothing) left
to lose by exiting. In other words, even if anyone ranked marginal plaintiff "autonomy"
over marginal optimal deterrence, it is doubtful that anyone would exit for a separate
action unless everyone else were forbidden to exercise the same freedom of choice.
5 See, for example, Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and
Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 Vand L Rev 561 (1993).
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indivisibly. These decisions cannot customize; that is, they cannot
specifically reflect or affect the specific interests, preferences, and
fortunes of any individual without destroying the welfare-
enhancing benefits of mass production. Essentially, mass produc-
tion liability based on "fault" (or negligence, that is, unreasonable
risk taking), turns on a statistical, not an individualized, stan-
dard of optimal precautions, and, as noted below, in purportedly
disaggregating it and particularizing the degree of wrong done to
a given plaintiff, courts make everyone worse off ex ante. 9 In de-
ciding the proper or reasonable level of precautions, the prospec-
tive defendant (for simplicity I ignore the prospective plaintiff's
contributions to precautions) necessarily aggregates all possible
accident scenarios and all possible marginal investments in pre-
cautions. If appropriately motivated, the defendant will minimize
the sum of accident costs: investment in precautions and related
accident risk. The defendant will take precautions at the level
that represents the point when making the additional marginal
investment in precautions costs more than the benefit derived
from avoiding the corresponding unit of accident risk. The pro-
spective defendant cannot know or predict how and to what de-
gree contemplated conduct will benefit or harm anyone in the
potentially affected population. The possibilities are infinite and
"knowable" only as statistically weighted probabilities; for deter-
rence purposes, the only useful knowledge of those probabilities is
their aggregate summation. Most important, countless key com-
ponents of that investment in precautions are beyond the practi-
cal power of the prospective defendant to adjust to any given
probabilistic scenario. In particular, defendants cannot customize
their risk-taking decisions to the individual needs and interests
of any given prospective plaintiff under any given set of circum-
stances.6 °
9 I presume that the conception of "wrong" incorporates at minimum some notion of
"fault" (negligence) implying liability grounded on "unreasonable" risk, not simply causing
risk and harm (strict liability). Ex ante, no one would rationally choose a system that
countenanced unreasonable risk taking, but everyone would rationally approve a system
that permitted, indeed, encouraged reasonable risk taking, provided that it also supplied
optimal insurance.
This point, that mass-production decisions about precautions (like every other
dimension of the undertaking) are probabilistically, indivisibly unitary, is not dependent
on transaction costs or imperfect information. It is important to realize that the ex ante
choice in favor of mass-production precautions is not a creature of market defects. Rather,
that choice stems directly from the premise that each individual desires maximum ex-
pected welfare in a world of scarce resources and uncertainty about his or her accident
fate and prospects in the chosen legal system. The preference for mass production holds
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Of course, the conceptual incoherence of the day-in-court
rhetoric does not prevent it from creating socially irresponsible
results. The law can be designed and enforced to disregard the
facts of life and welfare of individuals. (Civil liability driven by
the supposed "compensation" objective generally exemplifies this
perversity, paying out vast sums mostly in overhead to dispense
unneeded, highly expensive and risky "insurance" that is funded
by a regressive tax on the "beneficiaries.") Thus it can ignore the
statistical character of the "right-duty relationship" in accident
risk from business activity, which reflects the central, calculated
decision by the mass producer that fixes the parameters of the
benefit-risk quotient of any process or good based on averages of
all relevant demographic, legal, and other variables, including
price. (A Ford is a Ford everywhere, and the core design decisions
that set the benefit-risk quotient of a process or good and that
organize all the factors and features of related production, mar-
keting, and use are either reasonable or not reasonable, collec-
tively and indivisibly, for everyone affected.) The law, too, can
disregard the fact that the lives of everyone in the world depend
on the benefits from the scale economies of mass production proc-
esses and goods. But there can be no denying that if the law ac-
tually mandated pursuit of the illusory goal of individualizing a
"right-duty" relationship that is inherently unitary and aggre-
gate, the system would make everyone worse off ex ante by forc-
ing mass producers to forgo the benefits of mass production," in
even if we assume that individuals in that world could costlessly make market arrange-
ments with perfect information about all possible accident risks and related levels of pre-
cautions. When maximizing individual expected welfare is the priority of each person
behind the veil of ignorance, no one would rationally prefer a legal system that mandated
individually bargained, customized arrangements in lieu of the opportunity for scale-
economy gains from standardized, averaged mass-production arrangements. Conse-
quently, a decision-maker's attempt to disaggregate the synergistically related statistical
average estimates of accident risk and optimal precautions is not just an intellectually
incoherent exercise and a waste of system resources; it also undermines the fundamental
social objective of minimizing the sum of accident costs, because brute disaggregation
threatens to destroy the standardized means of mass production, to everyone's detriment.
" A simple example will make the point concrete. Suppose that X, who needs a car,
has a special preference for the safety features of antilock brakes and would derive suffi-
cient welfare from them to pay $110 for a car so equipped. But the only cars on the market
that generally meet X's needs are mass-produced vehicles costing one hundred dollars,
and because most buyers prefer normal brakes, -the manufacturer offers the antilock ver-
sion only as a twenty-five dollars option. Unwilling to pay $125 for a car with antilock
brakes, X buys one with ordinary brakes for one hundred dollars. Subsequently, X has an
accident while driving the car that results in some harm that could have been avoided
with antilock brakes. Suppose that in a suit against the car's manufacturer, the court-
disregarding X's informed choice and contract disclaimers-concludes that, because of X's
special preference for antilock brakes, their absence rendered the car unreasonably dan-
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addition to wasting resources and undermining optimal deter-
62rence and insurance.
gerous and justifies awarding damages for the harm that their presence would have
avoided. If the manufacturer anticipated that liability rule and knew of X's special prefer-
ence, it would have charged X a higher price for the car with normal brakes, in all likeli-
hood raising the price by more than ten dollars and, thus, to a level higher than X could
afford to pay. Such liability makes X and other similarly situated consumers worse off ex
post and all consumers worse off ex ante. If, however, it is impractical for the manufac-
turer to determine its customers' special preferences and to discriminate in price accord-
ingly, the manufacturer might spread the cost of expected liability thinly enough across all
buyers to enable X to afford the car with normal brakes. Nevertheless, because everyone
pays extra, without receiving net benefit for it, all consumers are thus worse off ex post as
well as ex ante.
Yet it might be possible for X to afford a car with antilock brakes if the court makes
the alternative excessively costly for the manufacturer. For example, the court might
regard the manufacturer's decision to pay damages rather than to supply the antilock
brakes as "wanton indifference to X's rights" and then impose punitive damages in an
amount that would make it economical to satisfy X's preference for $10 (or less) by spread-
ing the production cost across all buyers. From the ex post perspective, when consumers
know whether they have special preferences, those sharing X's preferences benefit at the
expense of others. But from the ex ante perspective, before individuals know whether they
will have special preferences, compulsory individualization by courts ex post destroys the
advantages of the standardized means of mass production and makes everyone worse off.
' Such dedication to the 'day in court" makes everyone worse off ex ante. Plainly, it
precludes welfare-enhancing collective action needed to secure optimal precautions and
insurance against accident. Nevertheless, courts take the "day in court" rhetoric seriously
enough to bar mandatory class actions. But surely an individual seeking maximum wel-
fare ex ante rationally prefers avoiding unreasonable risk to having the opportunity to
bear and complain about it.
Of course, it is possible that a well-informed individual might seek 'dignity" or
some other "expressive" value from having a separate day in court to confront the tortfea-
sor personally. But that desire, like any other that does not depend on collective action,
can be satisfied through the market ex post without threatening the regime ensuring
collective action to secure optimal precautions and insurance. Perhaps an individual
would prize confrontation sufficiently to spend a portion of his or her tort insurance pro-
ceeds to cover the costs-for defendant and court as well as plaintiff-of having a day in
court. This does not imply, however, that the individual ex ante prefers that courts make
the day in court mandatory. If an individual is risk averse, needs tort insurance, and
bears the cost of coverage, he or she wants the legal system to maximize wealth-based
utility by compensating accident losses (including related needs and wants) that money
can replace and satisfy with freely spendable money, not with fixed-in-kind goods.
Thus, suppose that a class action damage schedule compensates a $1000 loss at a
ten dollars cost compared to the alternative that allowed a class member to opt-out for a
separate day in court and would compensate the loss at a cost of ninety dollars more.
Assume that the individual ex ante has a fifty/fifty chance of being a plaintiff who prefers
a day in court to one who prefers the ninety dollars. Being risk averse, however, the indi-
vidual rationally prefers the damage schedule alternative. Representing the individual's
diminishing marginal utility of money by equating the welfare derived from any amount of
money with the square root of that amount, it is straightforward to show that the class
action damage schedule maximizes total net expected welfare compared to the individual's
day in court. By reducing risk of variance in wealth across the two relevant states of
world, the class action damage schedule yields total net expected welfare of 31.46, calcu-
lated as the square root of $990 net compensation x 100 percent. The individual day-in-
court option provides total net expected welfare of 30.73, calculated as the sum of having a
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IV. RISK BASED CLASS SETTLEMENT WITH "BACK-END OPT-OUT"
This Part briefly analyzes the use of so-called "back-end opt-
out" for class action settlements that resolve "future loss" or "ex-
posure-only" (risk-based) claims. Essentially the "back-end opt-
out" refers to a subset of the "class settlement opt-out." The fol-
lowing critique and conclusions apply fully to all versions of "class
settlement opt-out," including the "second" opportunity adopted
by the Judicial Conference.63
The back-end opt-out affords class members who, at the time
of class settlement, bear sanctionable risk but have not yet suf-
fered serious actualized harm, the choice between accepting the
class settlement terms for resolving their individual claims or
opting out for the settlement terms offered in the standard mar-
ket process. Like the second class settlement opt-out in general,
the back-end opt-out for risk-based claims serves as a means for
class members to capitalize on a favorable change in circum-
stances affecting claim values (for example, new scientific find-
ings regarding the causal connection in question) and to check
class counsel's temptation to provide deficient representation. I
examine the back-end opt-out first as used in the context of a set-
tlement-only class action, and next as part of the design for set-
tling a litigation class action. My central conclusion is that the
back-end opt-out serves no needed role in policing the adequacy of
class counsel representation, frustrates the social objective to
minimize the sum of accident costs by supplying needed optimal
deterrence and insurance, and makes everyone worse off ex ante
and ex post (excepting only the lawyers who profit from concoct-
ing and executing the plan).
A. Settlement-Only Class Action
In contrast to litigation class action, settlement-only class
action does not result in class action trial should the parties fail
to reach, or the court refuse to approve, a class settlement. In the
absence of settlement, the class action dissolves by definition, and
all claims return for trial through the standard market process of
separate actions. Thus, in the settlement-only class action, the
50 percent chance of having 31.46 in welfare from net compensation of $990 plus a 50
percent chance of having thirty in welfare from net compensation of $900. (Indeed, even if
ex ante the individual is risk neutral, he or she would rationally prefer the scheduled
average.)
"J Report at 8 (cited in note 1).
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threat of trial in a series of independently prosecuted, separate
actions creates leverage for the plaintiffs and value to settlement
for the defendant. By contrast, the litigation class action creates
an incentive for the defendant to settle class members' claims by
confronting it with the threat of a collectively prosecuted class
trial that eliminates the firm's asymmetric scale advantages,
thereby raising settlement values above those generated in the
standard market process.
A number of settlement-only class actions have resolved
risk-based claims by adding to the pre-certification opt-out
(or "front-end opt-out") an opportunity for class members to
accept the class settlement or to opt out at the back-end,
when and if they incur serious actualized harm.64
Proponents of this model argue that because class members
exercising back-end opt-out will have the benefit of a settlement
offer in and driven by the standard claims market process, the
opportunity for such exit will at the very least serve as a needed
deterrent against deficient representation by class counsel. In
addition, back-end opt-out would implement the anti-
redistribution principle by enabling class members to maximize
64 The following diagram depicts a settlement-only class action providing for both
front-end and back-end opt-out:
(1) (2) (3)
__ Class Class member stays







(1) The defendant and the class members at risk of suffering serious tortious harm ar-
range a class settlement establishing a schedule of damage payments for specified serious
harm if and as incurred by class members in the future.
(2) Before court approval of the class settlement, class members can choose either to re-
main in the class action or to exercise the "front-end opt-out" to prosecute claims in the
standard market process.
(3) Those class members who remain in the class action and incur specified serious harm
can choose either to accept the damage schedule payment under the class settlement or to
exercise the "back-end opt-out" to prosecute claims in the standard market process.
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claim-related wealth in the event of a favorable change in cir-
cumstances affecting claim values. On examination, back-end
opt-out makes class members worse off. Before making those
points, it is important to stress that claimants are best off set-
tling in a litigation class action, and gain little or nothing from
settling in settlement-only class action rather than in so-called
"inventory" or "aggregate" settlements in the standard market
process.
1. Lack of benefit from settlement-only class action.
The settlement-only class action offers no additional scale
economy and investment opportunities for development of the
merits of plaintiffs' claims above the scale opportunities that
standard market processes provide. This type of class action, as a
general matter, merely reproduces the claim recovery values gen-
erated by fractionally aggregated representation. This limitation
arises because settlement-only class actions are convened solely
to effect classwide settlement." Failure to achieve such settle-
ment-because the parties cannot reach agreement or because
they fail to obtain judicial approval-automatically dissolves the
class action and disaggregates the claims, relegating plaintiffs to
voluntary joinder without affecting the value of their claims. Liti-
gation class action is operationally, and therefore functionally,
distinct from settlement-only class action because failure to
achieve classwide settlement does not result in dissolution of the
litigation. Instead, the case proceeds to trial based on classwide
aggregation of all classable claims and with the benefit of the cor-
responding optimal investment. This key difference makes set-
tlement-only class actions inferior to litigation class actions.
Plaintiffs' bargaining power in settlement-only class actions de-
rives from whatever truncated scale economy and investment
opportunities they can marshal through disaggregated litigation
in the market. Consequently, settlement-only class actions deny
plaintiffs the opportunity to exploit investment scale optimally to
maximize aggregate benefit from the defendant's mass tort liabil-
ity. Any settlement in a settlement-only class action thus reflects
claim values depressed not only by the plaintiffs' suboptimal in-
' In other words, settlement-only class action requires the defendant's consent, and
no defendant would agree to a mode of settlement that increased its total costs above
those it would otherwise bear in the standard market process.
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vestment and other deficient scale incentives, but also by the de-
fendant's superior litigation power.66
Contingent on the circumstances of each case, settlement-
only class action may improve upon fractionally aggregated set-
tlements in the separate action process. To the extent that the
defendant credibly commits to settling claims only within the
framework and terms of the class settlement, it could avoid the
costs of strategic bargaining the firm would confront in the stan-
dard market process. In particular, it could thwart hold-outs in
the standard market process that demand excessive recovery or
that prevent a risk averse defendant from concluding "global"
settlement to relieve itself of the (presumably socially inappro-
priate) burden of long-term, massive exposure to liability, espe-
cially when it includes the prospect of open-ended or redundant
punitive damages. Indeed, the defendant is likely to pay class
members a "bonus" representing some share of the surplus from
avoided holdout costs, particularly in the latter case. Any savings
retained by the defendant, moreover, may have the beneficial ef-
fect of lowering the level of excessive deterrence that would oth-
erwise obtain were hold-out bargaining unabated.67
2. Lack of benefit from back-end opt-out.
Obviously, opt-out destroys any deterrence benefit from the
defendant being able to commit credibly to class settlement
terms.68 Diminished deterrence might be a necessary price to pay
for needed protection against deficient representation by class
counsel-in particular, against class counsel arranging a sweet-
heart class settlement-or for the opportunity to maximize claim-
related wealth from favorable changes in circumstances affecting
claim values. However, the price is not justified by either ration-
" This distinction is apt to blur in mass production risk cases in which there is
some probability that the court will certify a litigation class action, such as when claims
involve "moderate stakes" that fall between the determinative high and low categories. In
such cases, class settlement will reflect the class's additional bargaining power derived
from the probability of litigation class certification, even though the proceedings are
formally designated as a settlement-only class action. Accounting for cases with some
probability of litigation class certification, however, would merely complicate the analysis
but would not change its substance or conclusions.
" Of course, class settlement of a litigation class action provides the same and, in-
deed, greater deterrence benefits.
Opt-out might have the offsetting benefit of enabling defendant to mitigate some-
what a "lemons" problem: low value claims successfully masquerading as high value
claims.
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ale; indeed, allowing back-end opt-out makes all class members
worse off.
a) Preventing deficient representation. As in the litigation
class action, the incentive to arrange a sweetheart deal in the
settlement-only class action is effectively solved by structuring
the fee award for class counsel on the attorney's opportunity cost
of class settlement. Specifically, class counsel's share of the class
settlement recovery should not exceed the attorney's share of the
return from the claims that would have been resolved in the ab-
sence of the settlement-only class action, either by trial or by ag-
gregate settlement in the standard market process. For example,
suppose that class settlement would resolve one hundred future
claims valued at $1000 each for a total class recovery value of
$100,000. Assume that in the absence of class settlement, class
counsel would have litigated to judgment or settlement twenty of
these claims under a contingent-fee arrangement of 30 percent.
Thus the attorney would have earned a return on these claims
amounting to 6 percent (20/100 claims x 30 percent) of the total
aggregate recovery value in the standard market process. Apply-
ing that 6 percent share as the measure of class counsel's fee pro-
vides class counsel with the appropriate inducement to maximize
the class recovery value at $100,000. Class counsel has no incen-
tive to arrange a sweetheart deal with the defendant or otherwise
to shortchange class members. Doing so would reduce the class
recovery value and consequently depress class counsel's fee below
what the attorney could have received in the absence of class set-
tlement.9
b) Maximizing claim-related wealth. Back-end opt-out is not
needed for class members to capitalize on a favorable change in
circumstances affecting claim values. Exit would be needed only
if the class settlement specified fixed terms that did not vary, with
changed circumstances. But, there is no reason why class settle-
ment must adopt invariant terms, compelling class members to
bear some extra cost to file opt-out claims simply for purposes of
obtaining higher settlement recoveries in the standard market
process. The class settlement can readily provide for variable
payouts without the extra costs of filing an opt-out claim. Of
course, such a variable-term class settlement would eliminate the
69 As discussed above, court mandates for disclosure and denial of contract enforce-
ment are superior to opt-out as means of preventing kickbacks. Moreover, opt-out entails
costly monitoring and regulation to prevent "opportunistic" exercise by plaintiffi' attor-
neys, particularly free riders, seeking fees.
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potential for class and other counsel (including defense lawyers)
to generate unnecessary fees, and indeed, for many, fees for doing
nothing of value or at all.
This is not to say, however, that class settlements should
avoid fixed terms altogether. There are very good reasons why
class settlement should adopt certain fixed terms, in particular,
offering expected value of the contingent outcomes-favorable as
well as unfavorable changes in circumstances affecting claim val-
ues. Assuming, as is very likely true, class members are risk
averse, then, as shown in the discussion of optimal insurance
theory below, those in need of civil liability insurance would pre-
fer fixed to variable terms. Rather than chancing recovery of loss
in a system of variable payments (in which the amount paid de-
pends on the outcome of an uncertain event affecting future claim
value), a risk averse class member would always prefer a straight
fixed payment equal to the expected value of the variable pay-
ments. Even those who do not need insurance supplied by civil
liability would eschew the gamble of variable terms in favor of
cashing out their claims immediately-that is, receiving the ex-
pected value of a claim-and spending the money according to
their personal preferences. Risk-averse individuals generally (and
this includes defendants as well as plaintiffs) are better off hav-
ing a potential gain or loss converted to its present expected
value and paid in cash rather than taking any chances on a fate-
ful outcome.0
70 Another version of the back-end opt-out would enhance the value of exit by trading
the class claim for punitive damages for eliminating time-bar barriers to suit. This model
makes class members even worse off, squandering their recoveries, paying excessive fees
to lawyers, and undermining the reliability of opt-out as a means (however unneeded) for
checking deficient representation by class counsel. The trade merely moves money in a
circle: the defendant pays class members the aggregate expected value of punitive dam-
ages in class settlement; class members pay that amount back to the defendant for time-
bar waivers; the defendant then pays the same amount back to class members in aggre-
gate settlement in the standard market process. Over the course of these transactions, the
parties bear cost-notably, lawyers' fees-but reap no gain. In addition to extra cost, as
noted above, this churning makes risk averse class members worse off if there is some
probability of non-recovery from back-end opt-out.
Even were opportunism controlled, back-end opt-out would still fail as a reliable
market check. It would provide no meaningful indication of whether class settlement
appropriately estimates and allocates the aggregate expected value of several major
variables, including the number and distribution of future claims, changes in science or
other circumstances, and other gambles. An appropriately motivated class settlement
offer reflects the weighted average of these variables, discounted by the probability of a
pro-plaintiff development resulting in opt-out and commensurately higher-average set-
tlements in the standard market process. Thus, in the event of a pro-plaintiff
change in circumstances, class members will exit the class settlement in large num-
bers regardless of how well motivated, calculated, and allocated its terms are. The time-
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B. Litigation Class Action
This Part analyzes litigation class action employing back-end
opt-out. Having shown above that litigation class action with opt-
bar waiver enhancement further distorts the reliability of back-end opt-out as a market
check by increasing the rate of false positive exits. There is also the possibility of false
negatives; depending on how steeply claim values drop, class members may remain in
the class settlement even if its fixed offer is tainted by class counsel's self-dealing. Class
members are likely to remain in the class as long as the cost of exit and ensuing litiga-
tion exceeds the amount misappropriated by class counsel.
The enhanced back-end opt-out also fosters self-dealing by plaintiffs' attorneys,
class counsel and non-class counsel. The potential for considerable gain exists for class
counsel and other plaintiffs' attorneys, who have the prospect of reaping duplicative fees
from class-settled punitive damages. First, plaintiffs' attorneys receive court-awarded
fees based on the aggregate proceeds of that settlement. But plaintiffs' attorneys also
receive a second set of fees under separate agreements with class members who file
back-end opt-out claims; these fees are partly based on the increase in recovery related
to the time-bar waiver settlement proceeds purchased. For example, suppose a back-end
opt-out claim has an expected recovery value of one hundred dollars and the per-claim
value of class-settled punitive damages is ten dollars. The defendant's time-bar waivers
would then increase the expected value of those claims to $110. Class and other plain-
tiffs' attorneys would receive a double fee if the court awarded them some fraction of the
ten dollars per claim from class-settled punitive damages and would also receive a per-
centage of the expected $110 recovery from back-end opt-out claims under contingent-fee
agreements. This reward system further distorts the incentives of class and other plain-
tiffs' counsel; it causes them to favor the class settlement with enhanced opt-out
over straight class settlement, to forgo front-end opt-out despite the inadequacy of a
class settlement offer, and to exercise back-end opt-out despite its shortcomings.
To prevent these lawyers from charging duplicative fees, the court has two unat-
tractive options: either eschew awarding fees based on the aggregate value of class-
settled punitive damages or else preclude the attorneys from taking a commensurate
percentage from recoveries on back-end opt-out claims. A similar danger of distorting
lawyers' incentives arises regarding plaintiffs' attorneys who receive no court-awarded fee
from the proceeds of class-settled punitive damages. In representing claims under the
class settlement or on back-end opt-out, these attorneys gain by taking a contingent-fee
share of class members' total recovery, effectively charging for value created by the
waiver of time-bars, value which derives from the settlement proceeds and not from any
additional investment by the lawyers. If we return to the example from the text, the
lawyers apply their contingent-fee agreements to the $110 total recovery, even though
their back-end opt-out representation plausibly contributes only one hundred dollars of
additional value. To solve this problem, the court must prohibit the attorneys from taking
a share of the incremental recovery value attributable to the time-bar waivers for which
class members paid out of the proceeds of class-settled punitive damages. This solution,
however, places particularly heavy monitoring burdens on courts not only to identify
these attorneys, but also to audit fees in the majority of cases involving general, unallo-
cated settlements.
To the extent that courts award fees based on the total value of the class settle-
ment of compensatory as well as punitive damages, the problem of distorted incentives
becomes general. Class and other plaintiffs' attorneys will be led by self-interest to favor
this model over straight class settlement unless those awards are reduced to account for
the potential contingent fees these lawyers anticipate receiving from back-end opt-out
claims. As such, class settlement with back-end opt-out merely adds a layer of pure cost
in judicial fee setting and monitoring.
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out is unnecessary to prevent class counsel dereliction and un-
dermines deterrence, I shall devote this section to considering the
effects of exit-any exit-on potential insurance value from col-
lective adjudication. After briefly outlining the theory of optimal
insurance, I apply it to the design of the process and terms for
distributing a litigation class recovery. The main thrust of my
argument is to demonstrate the perversity of the anti-
redistribution principle.
1. Optimal civil liability insurance to cover reasonable risk.
Risk-averse individuals are concerned with not only the
probability of accident, but also the magnitude of the potential
economic loss relative to their wealth. Ex ante, the risk-averse
individual would be willing to purchase insurance against loss
from the residual, reasonable risk that optimal deterrence cannot
prevent. The theory of optimal insurance holds that, because risk
averse individuals derive diminishing marginal utility from
money, they will rationally agree to pay certain insurance premi-
ums to obtain full-not more or less-compensation for accident
losses they might suffer at some future time.71
Full coverage is optimal because it represents the point at
which further investment in premiums yields negative marginal
net benefits. Before reaching full coverage, each additional unit of
insurance coverage increases the individual's utility from wealth
if he or she suffers an accident more than it diminishes the indi-
vidual's utility from wealth if he or she does not suffer an acci-
dent. Essentially, full insurance coverage equalizes the individ-
ual's marginal utility from wealth between the accident and no-
accident states and thus increases expected utility. The individ-
ual effectively employs insurance to transfer wealth from the no-
accident state to the accident state up to the point at which an
additional dollar of wealth yields the same marginal utility in
either state. Beyond that point, the individual would follow the
reverse course.
2. Optimal insurance theory applied to class recovery.
To achieve optimal insurance in litigation class actions,
courts should distribute the aggregate class recovery-
" See Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 186-99 (Harvard
1987).
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established at trial or in settlement-by averaging out claim-
specific variables unrelated to severity of loss (or individual de-
terrence), thereby redistributing claim-generated wealth :from
less to more severely harmed class members.72 Ex ante, the risk-
averse individual in need of civil liability insurance rationally
prefers that the legal system awards damages according to sever-
ity of harm. Class members in need of civil liability insurance do
not want compensation to reflect the strength of their respective
legal claims, which depends on numerous variables uncorrelated
with severity of loss, such as differences in proof of defendant's
causal responsibility, governing law, and competence of counsel.
Accommodating this preference entails redistribution of claim-
related wealth. After establishing aggregate liability, courts
would effectuate the insurance plan that risk averse individuals
would, it is reasonable to presume, have established for them-
selves by contract with the defendant before the accident oc-
curred, if not for bargaining and information costs or other mar-
ket defects.
I emphasize that the justification for averaging includes cost
and information burdens that preclude perfect tailoring of dam-
age awards according to the precise value of a given class mem-
ber's claim. Contrary to the assumptions of many courts and
commentators,73  however, the ex ante individual welfare-
maximizing warrant and scope for averaging is neither depend-
ent upon nor limited by the information and administrative costs
that lead parties to average out marginal differences in settle-
ment. Even if damage awards could be tailored perfectly and
costlessly to the litigation value of each class member's claim, the
individual ex ante who is risk averse and in need of civil liability
insurance rationally prefers averaging to accurate determination
of all claim-specific variables unrelated to the severity of loss.74 To
" I use "averaging" here in the special sense of disregarding differences in litigation
value among claims in order to redistribute claim-related wealth in a manner consistent
with tort deterrence and insurance objectives.
" See, for example, Michael J. Saks and Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The
Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 Stan L
Rev 815, 835-36 (1992) (emphasizing "accuracy" for its own sake).
" See Rosenberg, 115 Harv L Rev at 855 (cited in note 6) (applying basic theory of
optimal insurance, which predicts that individuals who attach diminishing marginal util-
ity to money will seek, all else held constant, to minimize the variance in their wealth
across the accident and no-accident states of the world). The use of insurance theory to
allocate damages in mass torts and through class action damage schedules was developed
in David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk Based Claims in Mass-
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insist that "fairness" requires customizing awards according to
such variables is to impress upon individuals a system that
makes everyone ex ante worse off.75
Accident victims, for example, would never choose a system
of insurance in which the amount of compensation varies accord-
ing to the outcome of some event unrelated to severity of loss.
Similarly, risk-averse individuals would never want their acci-
dent compensation to depend on the outcome of such events that
do not correspond to an individual's need for compensation. Thus,
risk averse individuals would never choose a system in which the
compensation for a given cancer depended on a coin flip-
$100,000 if heads, $200,000 if tails (or worse still, all-or-nothing).
That system would be inferior, in the eyes of a risk-averse plain-
tiff, to one that simply paid $150,000. This basic tenet holds not
just for coin flips but for any uncertain event that is unrelated to
the severity of loss-be it the outcome of a sporting event or the
conclusion of a causation study. Rather than chancing recovery of
loss in a system of variable payments (in which the amount paid
depends on the outcome of an uncertain event), an accident vic-
tim would always prefer a straight fixed payment equal to the
expected value of the variable payments. For this reason, any
proposed system providing variable payments-except when their
variation tracks the severity of loss-is, from an insurance stand-
point, unambiguously inferior to one providing the average of the
variable payments with certainty.
Averaging or redistribution thus applies fully to every fac-
tor-factual, legal, litigation, strategic, and otherwise-unrelated
to severity of loss and individual deterrence." The implications of
this principle are significant for distributions from an aggregate
Exposure Cases, 71 NYU L Rev 210, 246 (1996); David Rosenberg, Class Action for Mass
Torts:Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, Ind L Rev 561 (1987).
" Optimal insurance thus minimizes variance in wealth between the no-accident
and accident outcomes by replacing accident loss completely and certainly. This premise
implies averaging out all legal and factual differences among class members except for
those relevant to assessing the severity (probability and magnitude) of accident loss or
deterring potential plaintiffs from taking unreasonable risks. The aim of fully replacing
accident loss requires that the loss be determined on an individual basis. An individual
facing a 10 percent chance of losing one hundred dollars rationally buys insurance to
replace the total loss of $100, not the average loss of ten dollars. Ten dollars is the actu-
arially fair premium that the individual pays to guarantee compensation of the one hun-
dred dollars loss with certainty. Moreover, consistent with optimal insurance theory,
payments of tort insurance should be individually adjusted, as far as practical, to
implement contributory negligence and other rules that provide incentives for the
tort insured to take reasonable precautions.
76 See Rosenberg, 115 Harv L Rev at 855 (cited in note 6).
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damage award in a class action judgment or settlement.77 It ap-
plies to all of the paradigmatic mass production risk cases, re-
gardless of the defendant's solvency, the amount of individual
loss and related damages at stake, and the differences in claim
values and the time when loss is incurred.78 Optimal insurance
theory therefore censures efforts to individualize mass production
risk liability in the name of the anti-redistribution principle,
"plaintiff autonomy," or other conceptions of self-determination
that disregard effects on individual welfare, in particular on the
well-being of those relying on tort liability to supply insurance.
To illustrate the averaging or redistribution principle with a
stylized example drawn from a recent, major class action settle-
ment of a mass exposure case,79 consider a class member confront-
ing a future loss of $100,000. Suppose the causal connection be-
tween the loss and the defendant's product remains uncertain on
the day of class settlement. Assume that, before the class member
incurs the loss, science will resolve the question with an equal
chance of finding that the probability of causation is 75 percent or
25 percent; either finding effects a commensurate change in the
probability of success at trial. Suppose the class member is given
the choice between two class settlements. The first is a binding
straight class settlement that pays with certainty an amount
equal to the expected value of the two outcomes: $50,000 (=50
percent x (75 percent x $100,000 + 25 percent x $100,000)). The
second class settlement offers either a fixed amount or the option
to exit at the back end to the standard separate action process
after scientific findings are announced. Given that the defen-
dant's total costs remain constant regardless of settlement struc-
ture, the class member will have the option of receiving $25,000
(the expected recovery in the event of pro-defendant scientific
findings) from class settlement or opting out for $75,000 (the ex-
pected recovery in the event of pro-plaintiff scientific findings)
from suit. (Class members could opt out for payment of $25,000 in
77 See id.
78 See id at 856.
71 See <http://www.settlementdietdrugs.com/pdfs/AmendedSettlementAgrement.pdf>
(visited Aug 26, 2003) (providing information on and administration of American Home
Products Corporation settlement trust). See also In re Diet Drugs Products Liability
Litigation, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 12275 (E D Pa); In re Diet Drugs Products Liability
Litigation, 2001 WL 497313, *8 (E D Pa), affd, 275 F3d 34 (3d Cir 2001) (explaining the
opportunities for Class members to decide whether to remain in the settlement or opt-out).
I note that I worked as an expert consultant for a nonparty concerning this matter. I base
the views expressed in this essay, however, entirely on public record information about
that case as well as about other mass tort cases in which I have been involved.
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the event of pro-defendant findings, but presumably that course
would entail extra cost and effort for no gain.) Plainly, a risk-
averse class member needing tort insurance prefers straight class
settlement to the back-end opt-out version. Both schemes have
the same expected value, but being risk averse, the class member
decidedly prefers payment with greater certainty."
CONCLUSION
This Article shows that permitting any opt out from class
actions-that is, complete exit from the class action to prosecute
a claim on both common and non-common questions by separate
action in the standard market process-imposes cost without
benefit. To the extent that personal safety and security depend on
civil liability to deter unreasonable risk-taking by mass produc-
ers, enabling opt-out undermines everyone's well-being. None of
the stated instrumental rationales for allowing opt-out, in par-
ticular prevention of class counsel perfidy or, in service of the
anti-redistribution principle, maximization of individual recover-
ies from settlement or trial, requires opt-out. Indeed, opt-out
proves counterproductive to achieving these ends. While very
costly to administer, opt-out not only fails to check defalcations
by class counsel, it actually raises the potential for disloyal repre-
sentation by non-class as well as class counsel. Opt-out also di-
minishes expected recoveries. For, at the same time it constrains
class counsel from fully exploiting class action scale economy and
investment opportunities to maximize the expected value of the
class claim, opt-out magnifies the litigation power of mass pro-
ducer-defendants over plaintiffs.
Mandatory class action is not inconsistent with effectuation
of the anti-redistribution principle-assuming for the sake of ar-
gument we should want to perpetuate this prescription for so-
cially pathological and profligate expenditure of legal resources.
Decoupling class action into two discrete (separate fee-award)
stages-the first determining aggregate liability and damages
and the second individualizing recoveries-would eliminate any
need for opt-out to serve the anti-redistribution principle. De-
coupling thus readily solves the problem of promoting the law
enforcement goal of optimal deterrence while adhering to the ap-
parent default rule precluding redistribution of claim-related
o For further critical analysis of a class settlement model exemplified by the phen-fen
class settlement, see Rosenberg, 115 Harv L Rev at 856-57 (cited in note 6).
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wealth relative to the baseline of projected separate action recov-
eries by enabling class members (and their hand-picked lawyers)
to seek and keep all the money they can individually extract from
their respective claims. Combined with simple restructuring of
the formula for setting class counsel's fee, decoupling deterrence
from distribution functions would assure that class counsel's in-
centives are both aligned with class interests and trained on
maximizing returns from class action scale economy and invest-
ment opportunities, thereby promoting optimal deterrence as well
as anti-redistribution ends.
The proposed two-stage model of a decoupled class action
provides the platform for further enhancing individual welfare by
replacing the anti-redistribution principle with a mandate to
promote the goal of optimal accident insurance. Thus instead of
being distributed according to the baseline measure of claim re-
covery values-a pure wealth transfer that imposes costs but
does not correlate with individual welfare gains-second stage
payouts would be determined strictly according to optimal insur-
ance theory. Relative severity of economic loss-with major loss
receiving disproportionate priority-would govern allotments;
distributions would take no account of any other claim-specific
variable (except as it might relate to motivating individual pre-
cautions against accident, for example through application of
rules like contributory negligence). Pursuing this insurance objec-
tive largely eliminates the costly individualization that substan-
tially depletes the compensatory value of civil liability recoveries.
Significantly, even if the costs of individualizing severity of loss
(and individual deterrence-related variables) for insurance pur-
poses reduces or even precludes recovery by some fraction of class
members (surely much smaller than in the more costly and risky
separate action process), decoupling fully achieves deterrence
goals (appropriately adjusted to offset the insurance shortfall) to
make everyone better off.
In the light of this analysis, the U.S. Judicial Conference en-
dorsement of a "second opt-out opportunity" for class action set-
tlements is worse than pointless: it is socially irresponsible. "Pro-
ceduralist" thinking is largely the inspiration for this misbegotten
policy. This mode of thought is characterized by metaphysical
postulates such as "fairness," "plaintiff autonomy," and so-called
"process values," the nature and consequences of which are never
defined or critically examined, and are so intellectually incoher-
ent as to be beyond rational analysis. Moreover, it abjures-often
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with disdain--consideration of "substantive" policy. Notably, dec-
ades-long proceduralist debate over mass tort class action rarely,
and then only superficially in passing, has referred to the effects
of choices among procedural schemes on tort law goals of deter-
rence and insurance.
The deontological and semantical formalism of proceduralist
thinking essentially rejects the functionalist, scientific approach I
have attempted to apply in this article. Functionalist analysis
translates "legal questions" into questions of social problems,
needs, and policy. Functionalist analysis evaluates (as well as
defines and classifies) regimes and rules of law solely in terms of
their operational effects on the individual and institutional be-
havior and interests relevant to achieving specified (but always
contestable) social objectives.
For the sake of social welfare, the proceduralist reign must
end. It (and its analogs in the "substantive" fields such as torts,
property, contracts, and constitutional law) has brought the civil
liability system to the point of chaos and crisis.8' That system
consumes vast social resources (upwards of two hundred billion
dollars annually for tort litigation alone) to render decisions of
social policy well beyond the capacity and resources of the deci-
sion-makers-judges, juries, and academic as well as practicing
lawyers. Thus, society cannot continue to rely on this wholly in-
expert and tremendously expensive system for effective regula-
tion of the safety of mass production processes and goods. Meet-
ing this social need (assuming an essential role for civil liability)
will require a fundamental, functionalist transformation of the
system, beginning with the law schools.
"' This is not a claim that proceduralist thought represents a uniquely flawed and
destructive mode of legal analysis. Much if not most of what passes as legal analysis, in all
fields and at all levels--education, scholarship, and practice of lawyers and judges-
suffers from the same defects. Nor is this a claim that proceduralist and other legal dog-
mas completely lack social utility; religion, mysticism, and mythmaking, broadly con-
ceived, generate norms, beliefs, and practices that can exert socially beneficial influence
on peoples' behavior. However, the social resources devoted to legal mythologizing seem
quite excessive: contriving, propagating, indoctrinating, and enforcing them is not brain
surgery, at least not in the literal sense. Moreover, experience suggests that we should
avoid as far as practicable governing by religious autocracy.
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